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Abstract 
What are the key determinants of taxpayer compliance? And which features of citizen-state relations 
govern attitudes and behaviour regarding taxation? This paper examines the analytical foundation, 
methodological approaches and key findings of available empirical literature on taxpayer behaviour in 
Africa. Understanding how citizens perceive and experience taxation may provide an essential 
diagnostic of the political realities for tax reform. Attempts to broaden the tax base require insights 
into how citizens experience and perceive the tax system, whether people perceive they are paying 
taxes or not, what they eventually pay, their views on tax administration and enforcement, and whether 
and how their tax behaviour is correlated with how they perceive the state. Attitude and perception 
surveys of current and potential taxpayers may also help to identify perceived weaknesses of the tax 
system, and enable tax authorities to focus attention efficiently on high-risk categories of taxpayers.  
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1. Introduction 
Tax evasion has been a universal and persistent problem throughout history with manifold economic 
consequences.1
Tanzi 2000b
 Two thousand five hundred years ago, Plato was writing about tax evasion, and the 
Ducal Palace of Venice has a stone with a hole in it, through which people once informed the Republic 
about tax evaders ( ).2
McKerchar and Evans 2009: 175
 Today, taxpayer non-compliance is a continual and growing global 
problem that is not readily addressed ( ). Yet, there are many 
indications that developing countries are hardest hit. Firm evidence on the extent of such practices is 
naturally hard to come by. But anecdotal evidence from different countries indicates that half or more 
of the taxes that could be collected remain uncollected and/or unaccounted for due to a combination of 
tax evasion, avoidance, tax exemptions and corruption (Richupan 1984; Bird 1992; 1989; Krugman et 
al. 1992; Fuest and Riedel 2009; Curtis et al. 2012).3
Cobham (2005
 The most widely cited study of the domestic 
component of tax evasion is ), who estimates that developing countries collectively lose 
USD 285 billion per year due to tax evasion in the domestic shadow economy.4
This erosion of the tax base has detrimental fiscal effects and there are at least four reasons for 
concern. First, revenue losses from non-compliance are critical in the context of substantial budget 
deficit (
  
Tanzi 1991). Second, tax evasion may have harmful effects on economic efficiency in general 
(Chand and Moene 1999; Tanzi 2000a), and income distribution in particular because the effective tax 
rates faced by individuals and firms may differ due to different opportunities for evasion (Hindriks et 
al. 1999). Third, underground economic activities are often the other face of  tax evasion and  the 
expansion of these may affect implementation and outcomes of economic policies (Tanzi 2000b; 
Cowell 1990). Finally, evasion and citizens’ disrespect for the tax laws may go together with 
disrespect for other laws and contribute to undermine the legitimacy of government (Graetz et al. 
1986). Consequently, tax evasion can have unintended negative effects on a society, undermining the 
purpose and outcomes of the formal tax system. 
Dealing with the policy problem of tax evasion requires at least some understanding of the factors 
underlying the individual’s decision whether to pay or evade taxes. More systematic and coherent 
information on taxpayer attitudes are required for better analysis and more informed tax policy design 
in Africa. Understanding how taxpayers think about and experience taxation may provide an essential 
diagnostic of the political realities for tax reform. Attempts to broaden the tax base require better 
knowledge of how the large majority of citizens perceive the tax system, whether people perceive they 
                                                     
1 Universally accepted definitions of tax avoidance and tax evasion do not exist. However, tax authorities 
commonly define tax avoidance as “an activity that a person or a business may undertake to reduce their tax in a 
way that runs counter to the spirit and the purpose of the law, without being strictly illegal” (Fuest and Riedel 
2009: 3). Tax evasion, on the other hand, usually refers to efforts by individuals, corporations, trusts and other 
entities to evade taxes by illegal means. Thus, both evasion and avoidance can be viewed as forms of tax non-
compliance, as they describe a range of activities that are unfavourable to a state’s tax system. 
2 Modern versions of this technology are Tax Evasion and Fraud Hotlines which many tax administrations 
around the world have installed. The Economist (July 17th 1996: 38) reported that in Uganda, on a special 
telephone hot-line people could report corrupt tax officials or tax dodgers. They got a reward, usually around 
10%, of the tax recovered. 
3 In 2003, the Guatemalan revenue administration (SAT) estimated the total tax evasion to be more than two-
thirds of actual collections (Mann 2004). For India, Mookherjee and PnG (1995) report a confidential survey 
finding that 76% of all government tax auditors took bribes, and that 68% of taxpayers had paid bribes. 
According to a study from Tanzania, official import statistics underreported the value of imports by as much as 
70% (ESRF 1996: 6). Evasion of other types of taxes was also reported to be widespread. In a business survey 
conducted in Uganda in 1998, covering 243 firms, as many as 43% said they were paying bribes to tax officers 
occasionally or always (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001 :22). 
4 Cobham’s calculation of tax evasion is based on estimates of the size of the domestic shadow economy by 
Schneider (2005, 2007). 
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are paying taxes or not, what they eventually pay, their views on tax administration and enforcement, 
what the perceived benefits of paying taxes might be, and whether and how their tax behaviour is 
correlated with how they perceive the state. Further, the political settlement between élites and citizens 
over how to raise public revenues is critical for state-building. Do ordinary citizens and élites have 
similar perceptions of taxation in a given country? Attitude and perception surveys of current and 
potential taxpayers may also help to identify perceived weaknesses of the tax system, as well as to 
enabling tax authorities to focus attention efficiently on high-risk categories of taxpayers. Finally, 
perception surveys offer an opportunity to explore cross-country similarities and differences, assisting 
regional policymakers to identifying good practise cases and lessons to be learnt.   
This study assesses the design and key findings of some of the existing taxpayer surveys in Africa. It 
reviews the analytical foundation, methodological approaches and evidence on citizens’ attitudes and 
behaviour with respect to taxation. While tax perception surveys are well established for OECD 
countries they are scarce in low income country contexts. Available studies in Africa are limited and 
provide little more than scattered estimates of the distribution of tax burdens and some information on 
attitudes towards specific, usually local, taxes. Some business surveys also include questions on 
taxation, focusing on constraints and compliance costs for enterprises. Few surveys have a large 
enough number of respondents and a sufficient range of variables to allow for rigorous quantitative 
testing of different theoretical explanations.  
The paper builds an argument for greater use of public opinion survey data by pointing to the strengths 
of such data, which include their ability to capture a broad range of explanatory variables known only 
to taxpayers, particularly their understanding of compliance requirements, relevant values and 
attitudes, expectations of risks and benefits of non-compliance. Identifying explanatory variables may 
help us tap into a variety of causal processes that have been posited in the literature, thus presenting 
opportunities to test theoretical explanations in the African context. The paper also addresses 
disadvantages of such surveys, including variations in definitions of issues such as non-compliance, 
the integrity of the respondents’ answers for deliberate or unintended reasons, and the inability to 
report on unintended omissions (OECD 2001). Further, surveys may be controversial in countries 
where the political contest is oppressive and tax authorities are unwilling to invite criticism of their 
integrity, public acceptance, and effectiveness. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the theoretical literature on 
taxpayer’s (non-)compliance behaviour. Section 3 outlines key research questions and hypotheses 
deriving from the theoretical literature. The analytical foundation, methodological approach and key 
findings of available empirical research on taxpayer attitudes and behaviour in Africa are examined in 
Section 4, which is followed by a concluding Section 5. Finally, based on the evidence that derives 
from this study, an agenda for further research is suggested in Section 6.  
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2. Understanding taxpayers’ behaviour: theoretical 
foundations  
Systematic and coherent analysis is required to shed led on taxpayers’ attitudes and the economic and 
behavioural determinants of tax compliance. Strategies to gather such information need to be 
embedded in sound theory. An understanding of the compliance literature is an important starting 
point. Models and theories of taxpayer behaviour, including the decision whether or not to pay taxes, 
tend to reflect one of five ‘schools of thought’ that can be referred to as: (1) economic deterrence; (2) 
fiscal exchange; (3) social influences; (4) comparative treatment; and (5) political accountability. 
These are to some extent interconnected and some represent an evolution of others.  
2.1 Economic deterrence  
Economic deterrence, or coercion, is the focus of the classical tax evasion model (Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972), which assumes that the taxpayer’s behaviour is influenced by factors such as the tax 
rate determining the benefits of evasion, and the probability of detection and penalties for fraud which 
determine the costs.5
The economic deterrence model relies upon a wide range of major assumptions that are generally 
unrealistic for determining behaviour (
 The problem is thus one of rational decision making under uncertainty whereby 
tax evasion either pays off in terms of lower taxes or subjects one to sanctions. This implies that if 
detection is likely and penalties are severe few people will evade taxes. In contrast, under low audit 
probabilities and low penalties, the expected return to evasion is high. The model then predicts 
substantial noncompliance. 
Andreoni et al. 1998). For example, it is assumed that all people 
respond to a change in any one variable in an identical and predictable manner; that all taxpayers have 
a full knowledge of the probability of being audited; and that all taxpayers have the same level of risk 
preference (McKerchar and Evans 2009: 175).6
Sandmo 2005
 The model has also been criticized by focusing 
exclusively on the coercive side of compliance, at the expense of the consensual ( ).  For 
instance, empirical data from the US and Scandinavia reveal that taxpayers pay much more tax than 
what could be accounted for even by the highest feasible levels of auditing, penalties and risk-
aversion. The question therefore has switched from “why do people not evade taxes” to “why do 
people pay?” (Alm et al. 1992; Slemrod 1992).  
In spite of this, the theoretical principles of economic deterrence have been widely adopted by tax 
administrations when developing enforcement strategies that rely principally on penalties and the fear 
of getting caught. There is, however, some evidence to support the relevance of deterrence strategies 
to addressing non-compliance (McKerchar and Evans 2009). For example, the fear of getting caught, 
or the probability of detection, has been found in some contexts to be an effective strategy to induce 
truthful behaviour. On the other hand, ‘moral’ factors have also been found to influence this decision. 
These results suggest that the economic deterrence models have some relevance to compliance 
behaviour, but that there are other influences also to be considered. Some of these are included in the 
fiscal exchange framework that we now turn to take closer look at. 
                                                     
5 Nearly all economic approaches to tax evasion are based on this economics-of-crime framework (Becker 1968). 
Cowell (1990) offers an insightful review of this analytical framework.  
6 Erard and Feinstein (1994) state that the standard compliance model fails to explain compliance behaviour due 
to the exclusion of taxpayer motivations. 
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2.2 Fiscal exchange  
The fiscal exchange theory suggests that the presence of government expenditures may motivate 
compliance. The proposition is well rooted in economics and political science (e.g. Cowell and 
Gordon 1988; Levi 1988; Tilly 1992; Slemrod 1992; 2003; Moore 1998; 2004). For instance, Alm et 
al. (1992) note that compliance increases with (perceptions of) the availability of public goods and 
services. They suggest that governments can increase compliance by providing goods that citizens 
prefer in a more efficient and accessible manner, or by more effectively emphasizing that taxes are 
necessary for the receipt of government services.  
Accordingly, the main concern of taxpayers is what they get directly in return for their tax payments in 
the form of public services (quid pro quo). In this perspective, taxation and the provision of public 
goods and services are interpreted as a contractual relationship between taxpayers and the government. 
Individuals may pay taxes because they value the goods provided by the government, recognizing that 
their payments are necessary both to help finance the goods and services and to get others to contribute 
(Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001). A taxpayer may therefore be seen as exchanging purchasing power in 
the market in return for government services. The existence of positive benefits may increase the 
probability that taxpayers will comply voluntarily, without direct coercion.7 Levi (1988 ) refers to this 
as quasi-voluntary compliance since compliance is motivated by a willingness to cooperate, but is also 
backed by coercion. It requires that citizens and businesses receive something from the government in 
return for the extractions government takes from them.  It also means that compliance is always 
conditional. It will vary as governments vary in their performance, honesty, attention to due process, 
and other determinants of government reliability. Without a material benefit, compliance becomes less 
assured. Although most taxpayers cannot assess the exact value of what they receive from the 
government in return for taxes paid, it can be argued that they have general impressions and attitudes 
concerning their own and others’ terms of trade with the government (Richupan 1987). It is then 
reasonable to assume that a taxpayer’s behaviour is affected by his/her satisfaction or lack of 
satisfaction with his/her terms of trade with the government. Thus, if the system of taxes is perceived 
to be unjust, tax evasion may, at least partly, be considered as an attempt by the taxpayer to adjust his 
terms of trade with the government.8
A main proposition of this analytical approach is that bargaining over taxes is central to building 
relations of accountability between state and society based on mutual rights and obligations, rather 
than on patronage and coercion (
  
Braütigam 2008; Moore 2004).9
                                                     
7 The potential for free riding is obvious when the government offers collective goods in return for taxes 
(Axelrod 1984). However, according to the Folk Theorem, voluntary provision may not always play as a 
“prisoner’s dilemma” game, in which each individual has an incentive to free ride on the provision of others. 
Instead, individuals may in many cases voluntarily contribute to a public good, implying that they will pay taxes. 
In theory, this occurs when service provision is both repeated and interdependent. See Gibbons (1992) for an 
introduction to the literature.  
 This idea of bargaining and 
negotiation over taxes is central to the concept of a social fiscal contract. This is essentially about 
stimulating good governance at the interface between state and society, in response to the demands of 
citizens. Thus, there is a strong argument that  substantial governance ‘dividend’ can be gained from 
8 Inferring from the core idea of a fiscal social contract, several more general theoretical propositions have been 
made (D’Arcy 2011: 5): (a) how a state earns its revenue determines its character (Moore 1998, 2004); (b) that 
the state is most responsive to those from whom it collects most of its revenue (Timmons 2005); and (c) that this 
dependency is the citizen’s chief bargaining tool to make the state more democratic, accountable and responsive 
(Levi 1988; Ross 2004). 
9 Moore (2004: 312) notes that “[I]f one starts from the assumption that a core governance problem lies in the 
dearth of bargained exchange relationships between the state and any organized societal group, then any 
collective action on the part of business to negotiate with the state over taxation might be considered to be 
potentially positive, even if it takes place entirely outside any representative or legislative institutional 
framework”. 
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mobilising domestic financial resources through the tax system (Braütigam et al. 2008). A ‘virtuous 
circle’ may be generated whereby the generation of government tax revenues leads to improved 
service provision, which in turn increases citizens’ willingness to pay their taxes.10
What factors make tax bargaining, either explicit or implicit, more likely to be successful? On-going 
research suggests that constructive tax bargaining may be more likely when (
 Seen in this light, 
tax is not just an administrative task for citizens and governments.  It is also about politics and power - 
the way that authority is exercised through its formal and informal institutions. 
Prichard 2010: 23): 
1. Various taxpayers perceive themselves to have common interests, and will thus pursue a broad 
tax bargain rather than narrow benefits (Moore 2008; Prichard 2009); 
2. There is a high degree of mutual trust amongst taxpayers (Fjeldstad 2004); 
3. Taxpayers are well organised politically and thus have the strength and unity to bargain 
constructively with government (Olson 1965; Levi 1988; Prichard 2009; Mahon 2005); 
4. Levels of awareness and education are high, so as to encourage political engagement (Prichard 
2009); 
5. Links between taxation and expenditure are relatively clear to taxpayers (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; 
Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001);  
6. Quasi-voluntary compliance is relatively important, thus providing stronger incentives for 
governments to seek a tax bargain (Bates and Lien 1985); and 
7. There is a minimum level of trust between taxpayers and government in order to facilitate 
bargaining (Prichard 2010). 
The fiscal exchange theory has received much attention and is well established theoretically. Empirical 
evidence to support the theory is, however, ambiguous (D'Arcy 2011: 5-6). Timmons (2005) find a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between tax revenues (i.e. compliance) and 
government expenditures on social welfare in a cross-country analysis. Ross (2004) also presents 
evidence to support the hypothesis about fiscal exchange in his study of the relationship between 
taxation and democratization in 130 countries. Fjeldstad (2004), on the other hand, found no 
significant association between fiscal exchange (measured by satisfaction with public services) and tax 
compliance in his investigation of survey data from South Africa.  
D'Arcy (2011) offers a possible explanation of the lack of sound evidence on fiscal exchange in the 
literature by suggesting that the analytical framework applied by researchers is too simplistic. In 
particular, she points to the fact that the modelled interaction between the citizen and the state is one-
dimensional. The conception of taxation as a market exchange between two actors in the public sphere 
misses a crucial aspect, she argues: “- the translation of private wealth into a public resource. (…) it 
goes beyond a two actor exchange and, in the transition from private to public, invokes not just the 
citizen’s normative and contractual relationship with the state, but also how a citizen views fellow 
citizens” (D'Arcy 2011: 5-6).  
Increasingly, researchers lean towards behavioural sciences and focus on the consensual aspects in an 
attempt to explain the positive motivations for compliance (Cummings et al. 2005). There is 
longstanding evidence from many disciplines, including psychology, sociology, accounting and 
                                                     
10 In practice, tax bargains may take the form of a relatively explicit quid pro quo between governments, 
taxpayers and their representatives, but also in the form of implicit behavioural adjustments (Prichard 2010: 22). 
Two general processes seem to be particularly important in practice: (i) direct tax bargaining which involves 
governments making relatively explicit concessions to citizens in response to the threat, or emergence of public 
resistance to taxation; and (ii) indirectly, in which taxpayer resistance to taxation by an unresponsive government 
undermines the stability of the government, leading to future reform (ibid). 
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economics, that behavioural factors influence non-compliance (e.g., Spicer and Lundstedt (1976); 
Grasmick and Scott (1982);Yankelovich et al. (1984); Cowell (1990); Smith (1992); Alm et al. (1992); 
Erard and Feinstein (1994)). Feld and Frey (2007, 2010) argue that citizens and the state appear to 
develop their fiscal relationships according to a psychological ‘tax contract’ that establishes fiscal 
exchange between taxpayers and tax authorities. This relationship, however, reaches beyond pure 
exchanges, and involves relationships and loyalties between the ‘contract partners’. Consequently, 
Andreoni et al. (1998) argue that researchers need to explore the psychological, moral, and social 
influences on compliance behaviour and integrate these factors into economic models of compliance.  
The behavioural literature on tax compliance incorporates social and political motives to explain a 
sense of morale or social duty to pay taxes (Andreoni et al. (1998: 851)). Three main lines of 
theoretical arguments have been made in relation to tax morale, i.e. arguments focusing on (i) social 
influences, (ii) comparative treatment of citizens, and (iii) the strength of the national political 
community. Each of these is now presented in turn.  
2.3 Social influences  
It is reasonable to assume that human behaviour in the area of taxation is influenced by social 
interactions much in the same way as other forms of behaviour (Snavely 1990). Compliance behaviour 
and attitudes towards the tax system may therefore be affected by the behaviour of an individual’s 
reference group such as relatives, neighbours and friends. Therefore, if a taxpayer knows many people 
in groups important to him who evade taxes, his/her commitment to comply will be weaker. On the 
other hand, social relationships may also help deter individuals from engaging in evasion in fear of the 
social sanctions imposed once discovered and revealed publicly (Grasmick and Green 1980; Grasmick 
and Scott 1982). Theoretical research on herd behaviour in economic situations (Banerjee 1992; Sah 
1991) also indicates that social influences may affect compliance, in particular by affecting the 
perceived probability of detection.  
One of the most consistent findings about taxpayer attitudes and behaviour in Western countries is that 
those who report compliance believe that their peers and friends (and taxpayers in general) comply, 
whereas those who report cheating believe that others cheat (Yankelovich et al. 1984). Evidence 
suggests that perceptions about the honesty of others may affect compliance behaviour. 
2.4 Comparative treatment 
Equity theory suggests that individuals are more likely to comply with rules if they perceive the 
system that determines those rules to be impartial (McKerchar and Evans 2009: 176). Where there are 
perceived inequities, individuals will adjust their inputs to the exchange until fairness is restored. 
Based on equity theory, addressing inequities in the exchange relationship between government and 
taxpayers would result in improved compliance.  
Citizens may not consider their relationship with the state in a vacuum where both parties are the only 
actors. Likewise, they may not think about their fellow citizens without considering their own 
relationship with the state. They may also consider how the state treats them relative to their fellow 
citizens. This judgment is likely to affect not only their judgment of the state, but also how they view 
their fellow citizens (D'Arcy 2011: 7). If the state treats certain groups preferentially, this may colour 
the citizen’s relationship with the state and the group receiving favours. A crucial variable is then not 
just what a person (or a business) gets from the state, but what the person (or business) gets from the 
state (and how the state treats the person) relative to those who are in the person’s wider national 
community. This social psychology model highlights the importance of equity theory in the study of 
compliance and taxpayer behaviour.  
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Rothstein and Teorell (2008) take this argument further and argue that ‘impartiality’ in the exercise of 
power is the key characteristic of ‘good governance’. They  emphasize that the state’s legitimacy rests 
on its impartiality, i.e. the state’s “proven ability to treat citizens equally in dealings with them and to 
adjudicate impartially in disputes between them” (D'Arcy 2011: 8). Citizens feel able to trust their 
fellow citizens if they trust the state to intervene and resolve fairly when there is a breakdown in 
relations between citizens. Thus, compliance rests not only citizens’ trust in government, but also on 
their trust in each other.   
2.5 Political legitimacy 
One strand of the literature emphasises that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher 
tax compliance (Torgler and Schneider 2007). Tayler (2006: 376) argues that legitimacy makes 
“people feel that they ought to defer to decisions and rules, following them voluntarily out of 
obligation”. Legitimacy could be described as belief or trust in the authorities, institutions, and social 
arrangements to be appropriate, proper, just and work for the common good. According to the political 
legitimacy theory, tax compliance is positively related to perceptions about the government’s, in 
particular the tax authority’s, trustworthiness (Tayler 2006; Kirchler et al. 2008; Fauvelle-Aymar 
1999). Related to political legitimacy is identification with the state in the sense of national pride. 
Researchers have suggested that the group identification deriving from national pride fosters 
cooperative behaviour and willingness to pay taxes (Torgler and Schneider 2007). 
Political scientists have addressed how political legitimacy and civic identification are fostered. 
Persson (2008) argues that African countries that upon independence emphasized building national 
over ethnic identity have been more successful than those who allowed ethnicity to become the main 
animus of politics. She uses Botswana as an example of a state that succeeded in the construction of a 
national identity and Uganda as a case that failed to do so. Lieberman (2003) argues that the definition 
of National Political Community (NPC) is crucial. In an analysis of data from national surveys, he 
compares South Africa under Apartheid, where the NPC was small, exclusive and racially defined, to 
Brazil where regionalism was the main logic in an NPC that was large with many cross-cutting 
cleavages. Lieberman attributes the higher revenue performance of South Africa to the superior ability 
of a small, exclusive and cohesive group to solve collective action challenges like taxation. Citizens’ 
evaluations of their obligations to the state, including tax compliance, were largely conditioned by 
feelings of closeness or affinity towards other groups included in the state’s definition of the national 
political community. 
Empirical studies conducted in other regions also find evidence that political legitimacy and national 
pride are important to tax compliance. Alm et al. (2005) find a positive relationship between attitudes 
towards tax and trust in the government as well as national pride in Russia in the 1990s. Based on a 
study of 30 developing and developed countries, Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006) find that tax 
compliance is highest in countries characterised by high control of corruption and low size of 
bureaucracy. 
Five ‘schools of thought’ on taxpayer behaviour have been presented above. In the following section, 
theory inspired research questions and hypotheses to guide empirical research are formulated. 
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3. Research questions and hypotheses deriving from the 
theories 
A similar set of tax research questions that Western scholars have grappled with also concern studies 
of African societies: Under what conditions do citizens assent to comply with the tax laws? What are 
the primary motivations for compliance? What are the key determinants of tax attitudes and 
behaviour? Which features of citizen-state relations govern attitudes and behaviour regarding taxation? 
Which theoretical school best explains citizens’ willingness to part with private resources? 
Answers to these questions are important because they can inform policy makers about how to extend 
the reach of tax administrations. They may provide insights into what social, economic and political 
goods governments need to provide to citizens to ensure that taxation is accepted as a normative act; 
insights into the relationship between perceptions of supply and demand for democracy and taxation; 
and ultimately information about which actions could ensure the state the credibility and legitimacy 
necessary for effective governance. 
3.1 The African context  
The research questions that dominate the theoretical literature on tax compliance are as pertinent to the 
African context as elsewhere. However, certain socio-political conditions and variables common to 
many African states are likely to influence citizens’ behaviour and thus shape the research findings. 
For meaningful research design and analysis, specific features of the African context should be noted: 
• Relatively low GDP per capita. 
• Young populations 
• Extreme income inequalities. 
• Low levels of human development (education, health). 
• Dominant ruling parties and, generally, weak opposition, civil society and media. 
• Colonial histories affecting attitudes towards the role of the state, governance and the type of 
public institutions, including tax administration, of a country. 
• Limited (administrative) reach of national government institutions, in many cases to mainly 
urban and semi-urban areas. 
• Large informal sectors. 
• Widespread public and private sector corruption. 
• Limited delivery of quality and diversity of public services by governments to citizens. 
• Relatively narrow public revenue base from which to provide goods and services. 
• Differing perceptions regarding service delivery across urban versus rural populations. 
Yet, there are wide divergences across African states on most variables. Generalised explanations are 
therefore problematic. Cross-national variations require a more detailed examination of country-
specific factors. 
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3.2 Tailoring research questions and hypotheses 
Mutual consideration of the African context and recent scholarly work on taxation generate several 
pressing research questions and hypotheses for further research on African’s tax attitudes and 
behaviour. These can be grouped after the five major theoretical approaches outlined in section 2 
above: 
Economic deterrence 
Research questions deriving from this theoretical framework include:   
• How do citizens perceive the likelihood of being detected and punished if evading tax? 
• How do citizens perceive the credibility or trustworthiness of the revenue administration’s 
sanctions against defaulters?  
The following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 H1 Compliance is more likely when the probability of detection and prosecution is perceived to be 
high. 
 H2 Compliance is more likely when sanctions against tax evasion are perceived to be severe. 
Fiscal exchange 
Research questions deriving from this theoretical framework include:   
• Do citizen’s attitudes towards taxation depend on their perceptions about the state’s delivery 
of (political, social and economic) services? 
• If yes, what aspects (quality, access) and types of services (e.g. education, housing and health) 
matter most? 
• Does one’s position in the social structure/demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
education, income level, profession, urban-rural, etc.) have a bearing on (a) citizens’ attitudes 
toward taxation, and (b) the state’s delivery of services and goods?  
The following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 H3 A taxpayer is more likely to comply when she/he perceives her/his terms of trade with the 
government as fair. 
 H4 A taxpayer assents to pay tax because he/she is satisfied with the services received in 
exchange.  
 H5 Citizens who frequently contribute taxes (employed, urban) have higher expectations of 
government to deliver goods and services than those who are unemployed/do not pay taxes. 
 H6 Middle class citizens are more likely to assent to the normative arguments for taxation 
(reciprocity, development of state etc.). 
Challenges facing these hypotheses include: (i) which services are of most concern, and (ii) what 
aspects of service delivery are critical to the citizen? The answers to these questions are also likely to 
differ between citizens depending on age, gender, geographical location etc.     
Social influences 
Research questions deriving from this theoretical framework include:   
• Are peoples’ tax behaviour influenced by their perception of others’ behaviour? 
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The following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 H7  The fewer evaders a taxpayer knows, the more likely he/she will comply.  
Comparative treatment 
Research questions deriving from this theoretical framework include:   
• How do people perceive they are treated by the state/tax administration relative to other 
people in their community? 
• Do economic and politically weaker or marginalised groups tend to perceive taxation 
differently than more prosperous and influential groups? 
• Does one’s ethnic group (group or regional identities) determine how they perceive the state’s 
delivery of services?  
The following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H8  A citizen assent to pay tax because she/he feels that the state treats her/him fairly relatively to 
fellow citizens.   
Political legitimacy 
Research questions deriving from this theoretical framework include:   
• Are people more compliant when they feel the government is politically legitimate? 
• Is there a relationship between attitudes towards democracy and attitudes towards taxation? 
• Is there a relationship between citizen’s perceptions of government accountability and 
attitudes towards taxation?  
The following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H9 Citizens assent to pay tax because they feel the government is legitimate and accountable. 
H10 Citizens assent to pay tax because they feel a strong sense of national identification with their 
fellow citizens.  
In what direction do these relationships and associations work? Causality is an issue for further 
investigation. For instance:  
• Does compliance follow from coercion? 
• Does compliance follow perceptions of state legitimacy and accountability? 
• Do state legitimacy and accountability follow from state responsiveness (delivery of services)? 
Yet, the state requires compliance (and tax revenues) before it can deliver goods and services 
using public finances. 
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4. Tax perception studies in Africa  
This section examines the use of surveys to gather evidence on citizens’ behaviour and attitudes 
towards the tax system. While tax perception surveys are well established for OECD countries, 
available studies in Africa are limited and provide little more than scattered estimates of the 
distribution of tax burdens and some information on peoples’ attitudes towards specific, usually local, 
taxes. Some business surveys also include questions on taxation, focusing on constraints and 
compliance costs for enterprises. The main part of this section assesses the design and key findings of 
some of the existing surveys in Africa. The studies examined are categorised into three groups: (1) 
Business surveys, aiming to identify main constraints for investors and entrepreneurs; (2) Country 
specific citizen surveys, addressing peoples’ views of a range of issues, including the tax system, tax 
payment, trust in public institutions and service delivery; and (3) Cross-country citizen surveys.11
4.1 Business surveys 
 
Finally, the strengths and disadvantages of such surveys in the African context are discussed.  
Business surveys have been conducted in several African countries during the last decade, focusing on 
business constraints and compliance costs for enterprises. The most comprehensive of these is the 
Doing Business study conducted by the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank (Doing 
Business 2011). It covers a wide range of variables (including taxes) that may impact the business 
environment in a large number of countries across the globe. In addition, country specific business 
surveys have been conducted in several African countries. In the following we start out by discussing 
the cross-country Doing Business and Paying Taxes studies, followed by a presentation and discussion 
of selected country specific studies.   
4.1.1 Cross-country ‘Doing Business’ and ‘Enterprise’ surveys  
The Paying Taxes study looks at tax systems from the business perspective. The sixth edition of 
Paying Taxes - the Global Picture was published in 2012.12
Doing Business 2011
 It is a joint publication produced by the 
World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The 
study is based on data collected as part of the Doing Business report ( ) and the 
2012 report covers businesses in 183 countries (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). Doing Business 
reports generally receive wide media attention when published and commonly initiate public debates 
about whether the business environment is conducive or not compared to other (usually neighbouring) 
countries. Although Doing Business does not explicitly aim to shed light on taxpayers’ (firms) 
perceptions of the tax system in the country they operate, it is likely that these surveys impact on the 
business community’s - as well as (potential) foreign investors’ - perceptions of the tax system in 
individual countries. It is therefore relevant to include a discussion of these surveys in this paper.  
Doing Business records the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size company must pay 
in a given year as well as measuring the administrative burden of paying taxes and contributions.13
                                                     
11 A fourth category of surveys labeled ‘Taxpayer satisfaction surveys’ is not covered by this study. These 
surveys are mainly conducted by the national revenue administrations in individual countries, and focus, 
generally on central government taxes and tax administration.   
 
Taxes and contributions measured are profit or corporate income taxes, social contributions and labour 
12 The Paying Taxes report 2012 can be downloaded from 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Special-Reports/Paying-Taxes-
2012.pdf  
13 The methodology applied is presented in PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012: 95-100, appendix 1).  
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taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, property transfer taxes, dividend tax, capital gains tax, 
financial transactions tax, waste collection taxes, road and vehicle taxes, and any other small taxes or 
fees (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011: 78).14
Doing Business uses a case study scenario to measure the taxes and contributions paid by a 
standardised business and the complexity of an economy’s tax compliance system. Tax experts from a 
number of different firms in each country compute the taxes and mandatory contributions due in their 
jurisdiction, based on the standardized case study facts (
 The ranking on the ease of paying taxes is the simple 
average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011: 75). 
Information is also compiled on the basis of the frequency of filing and payments, as well as the time 
taken to comply with the tax laws in an economy.  
The method applied in Doing Business is simple, which has some real benefits, not least because it is 
accessible to policy-makers who can make up an informed opinion about the results. The authors of 
Doing Business claim that some more sophisticated, although standard statistical scaling methods do 
not change the results. However, Hoyland et al. (2008) show that if the uncertainty in the data is taken 
into account, it becomes difficult to tell most countries apart on the aggregated ranking. Thus, a move 
of 20 or 30 places on the ranking may not reflect any real-life improvement of the underlying 
business-environment of the country. It may simply be due to random noise or margin of error. 
Further, while the main body of the text and the country tables in Doing Business present a wide range 
of indicators across ten different areas, it is not always clear from the report which indicators are 
included in the final ranking, and what criteria are used for including or excluding an indicator in the 
calculation of the ranking. Hoyland et al. (2008: 11) show that (a) several of the indicators presented in 
Doing Business are not used for rankings, and (b) coding-decisions taken before calculating the 
rankings are not transparent. In spite of these and other methodological challenges, the Doing Business 
country ranking receives widespread attention and is widely referred to by policy makers, investors 
and business people.  
The Paying Taxes part of the Doing Business report (Doing Business 2011) focuses on the potential to 
simplify the tax system and improve revenue collection in reducing tax evasion and the size of the 
informal economy in developing countries. Although it is not made explicit in the Doing Business 
reports, the theoretical foundation for the ‘tax constraint indicators’ implicitly refer to (a) the classical 
tax evasion model, which assumes that a taxpayer’s behaviour is influenced by factors such as the tax 
rate and the effectiveness of the tax administration to enforce taxes due, including compliance costs 
(section 2.1 above), and (b) the comparative treatment model, which assume that taxpayers’ behaviour 
is influenced by how they perceive they are treated by the state relative to other taxpayers/businesses  
(section 2.4).  
The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation also conduct so called “Enterprise 
Surveys”. These are firm-level surveys of a representative sample of a country’s private sector, and the 
surveys site (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/) contains data on the investment climate and business 
perceptions of firms in 135 countries. The data are based on surveys of almost 130,000 firms and 
contains, among other issues, rankings of the largest constraints for investment. In the following, we 
present relevant results from the Enterprise Surveys as well as from Doing Business 2012 for nine 
African countries. We have selected the  sub-Saharan countries Benin, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa and Zambia against the background that we will use 
                                                     
14“Doing Business measures all taxes and contributions that are government mandated (at any level - federal, 
state or local) and that apply to the standardized business and have an impact on its financial statements. In doing 
so, Doing Business goes beyond the traditional definition of a tax. As defined for the purposes of g overnment 
national accounts, taxes include only compulsory, unrequited payments to the government. Doing Business 
departs from this definition because it measures imposed charges that affect business accou nts, not government 
accounts” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012).  
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data from these countries to examine taxpayer attitudes and behaviour in a forthcoming study (see 
Section 6 below) .15
4.1.1.1 Findings from enterprise surveys 
   
In the Enterprise survey, firms are asked whether they find a range of issues to be obstacles to the 
current operations of the firm, and have the following options: “No obstacle”, “Minor obstacle”, 
Moderate obstacle”, “Major obstacle” and “Very severe obstacle” (Enterprise Surveys 2012b). Figure 
1 depicts the share of firms in the private sector that rate each of the six tax-related obstacles as major 
or very severe constraint on the business environment in each of the nine selected countries as well as 
the average for sub-Saharan Africa.16 17
Figure 1: Largest tax-related business obstacles experienced by firms in the private sector 
 
 
 
Similarly, figure 2 shows major business constraints not related to taxation.  
                                                     
15 In addition, Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi and Mali might be added depending on data availability from 
Afrobarometer Round 5.  
16 Source: Enterprise Surveys (2012a) ( http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/) 
17 The data for Benin and Sierra Leone are from 2009; the figures for Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, South 
Africa and Zambia are from 2007; and the data for Tanzania and Uganda are from 2006. 
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Figure 2: Largest non-tax related business obstacles experienced by firms in the private sector 
 
On average in Sub-Saharan Africa, (1) electricity was found to be the most important constraint, 
followed by (2) access to, and cost of, financing, (3) practices of the informal sector, (4) tax rates, (5) 
political instability, (6) corruption, (7) crime, (8) access to land, (9) transportation, (10) customs and 
trade regulations, (11) tax administration, (12) inadequately educated workforce, (13) business 
licensing and permits, (14) labour regulations and (15) courts.18
Access to finance is the second most important constraint to firms regionally (20%) and this is listed 
among the four most frequently stated obstacles in all the selected countries. Practises of the informal 
sector are the third largest business obstacle in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and also seem important 
in the selected countries. It is rated the second largest constraint for enterprises in Mozambique and 
Zambia, third largest in Benin, Kenya and Uganda, and fourth largest in Senegal and Sierra Leone. In 
South Africa and Tanzania, informal sector practises is rated somewhat less important (7th and 8th 
largest constraints, respectively).  
 While tax rates were found to be 
among the top five constraints for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (and among the top 10 constraints in 
all the case study countries), tax administration is seen as less problematic by businesses. In three of 
the selected countries, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Zambia, the tax rate is the most frequently mentioned 
business constraint. In the other countries, other, non-tax related issues are more important. Electricity 
is seen as the most important obstacle in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, while firms in Mozambique 
and Benin perceive access to finance to be the major business constraint. Finally, South African 
businesses perceive crime, theft and disorder as the largest obstacle to the business environment. 
Though there are many similarities between the selected countries, there are also important 
differences. In particular, the business constraints reported for South Africa differ from the regional 
average as well as those reported by the other countries in Figure 1 and 2. As mentioned above, South 
African firms rate crime, theft and disorder as the most important obstacle. However, regionally, crime 
                                                     
18 Inadequately educated workforce and labour regulations are not displayed in the figures due to space 
constraints. 
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is only rated seventh most important. Crime is also further down on the lists of each of the selected 
countries. In Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda, crime is not even among the ten most important 
obstacles, while in Benin it is perceived as the 10th largest business constraint. In Tanzania and Zambia 
it ranks 6th and, finally, crime is the 5th largest obstacle in Kenya and Mozambique. Furthermore, 
South Africa is the only country where inadequately educated workforce is rated among the five most 
important obstacles for business. There are also large cross-country variations in the share of 
businesses that rates electricity as the most important constraint. In Tanzania, 73% of the firms 
reported electricity to be a barrier, but only 9 % of the firms did so in Mozambique.   
Figure 4 shows the average number of meetings with tax officials required each year for firms of 
different sizes. Small firms are those with 1 to 19 employees, medium-sized firms employ between 20 
and 99 workers, and large firms employ more than 100 workers. 
Figure 3: Average number of visits or required meetings with tax officials by business size 19 20
 
 
According to Figure 3, there are no substantial differences between firms of different sizes except for 
in Kenya, Sierra Leone and Zambia. Kenya exhibits the largest variations. Large Kenyan firms have 
much fewer meetings with tax officials than medium size businesses (4.1 visits difference), and 
medium size businesses have much fewer visits than small firms (2.4 visits difference). In Sierra 
Leone the situation is a bit different. Medium sized firms have more visits than both small and large 
firms, and medium sized firms have more visits by tax officials than small firms. Yet another pattern is 
displayed by Zambian firms. For them, number of meetings is increasing by firm size.  
The figure also illustrates that the average level of visits by tax officials is markedly higher in Kenya 
(8.8) than in the other countries which all have an average number of visits in the area between 1.8 and 
3.3.  
                                                     
19 Source: Enterprise Surveys (2012) 
20 The average is estimated based on the respondents answering 'yes' to the questions of whether visits or 
meetings were required.  
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4.1.1.2 Findings from Doing Business 
The Doing Business database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/) provides measures of business 
regulations and their enforcement (Doing Business 2011). It indicates the regulatory cost of business, 
and includes a wider range of countries and subjects than the enterprise surveys. The countries are 
ranked in terms of the ease of doing business, which is an overall ranking of 10 elements relevant to 
the business environment. The individual elements in ‘ease of doing business’ are (1) starting a 
business, (2) obtaining and renewing licenses, (3) employing workers, (4) registering property, (5) 
getting credit, (6) protecting investors, (7) paying taxes, (8) trading across borders, (9) enforcing 
contracts, and (10) closing a business. Table 1 shows the overall ranking of countries in terms of ease 
of doing business. The right column describes the ranking on ease of paying taxes which is one of the 
ten elements of which the ease of doing business entails.  
Table 1: Worldwide rank on ease of doing business and ease of paying taxes in selected African countries 
(ranking within sub-Saharan Africa in brackets) (Doing Business 2012)(Doing Business 2012)(Doing Business 
2012)(Doing Business 2012)21
 
 
Rank 
 
Ease of doing business Ease of paying taxes 
South Africa 35 (2) 44 (7) 
Zambia 84 (7) 47 (8) 
Kenya 109 (9) 166 (36) 
Uganda 123 (12) 93 (14) 
Tanzania 127 (14) 129 (25) 
Mozambique 139 (18) 107 (20) 
Sierra Leone 141 (19) 76 (12) 
Senegal 154 (26) 174 (40) 
Benin 175 (39) 170 (38) 
South Africa is rated highest, while Senegal and Benin are at the bottom of the list both in terms of 
doing business and paying taxes. However, some of the other countries are performing much better on 
one ranking than the other. For instance, Kenya is ranked as 109th on the ease of doing business 
worldwide, but is rated as low as 166 on the ease of paying taxes. For Sierra Leone it is the other way 
around; it is ranked 141st on the ease of doing business, but does much better in terms of paying taxes 
(76th). These findings strengthen the impression from the Enterprise surveys discussed above (see 
Figure 1 and 2): there seems to be substantial variations in business constraints between the countries 
in our sample. 
Figure 4 gives a graphic presentation of the three components of the ease of paying taxes indicator 
discussed above, namely the average of the total number of tax payments, the total number of hours 
spent on preparing taxes and complying with rules and laws, and the total tax rate (measured as share 
of commercial profits), for medium-sized companies each year (Doing Business 2010: 53). The figure 
includes all the selected countries, as well as the regional and OECD average. 
                                                     
21 Source: Doing Business (2012).  
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Figure 4: Time spent paying taxes, number of payments and total tax rate on profits in selected countries 22
 
 
The Figure shows that the total tax rate on profits is lower than the SSA average rate (57% of profit)23
The average number of payments made by firms is more than three times the size in SSA than in the 
OECD region (37 vs. 13 payments). Among the countries in our sample, Senegal (59), Benin (55), 
Tanzania (48) and Kenya (41) lie above, and Uganda (32), Sierra Leone (29) and South Africa (9) 
below, the regional average. Mozambique and Zambia have numbers equal to the regional average. 
South Africa is the only country where the number of payments is lower than the OECD average. 
 
in all the selected countries except for Benin (66%), which has the highest total tax rate in the sample. 
Zambia is by far the country with the lowest tax rate on profits (15%), and, together with Sierra Leone 
(32%), South Africa (33%), Mozambique (34%) and Uganda (36%), it has a rate below the OECD 
average of 43%. Tanzania (46%), Senegal (46%) and Kenya (50%) all have tax rates on profits 
between the OECD and SSA average.  
The variation in time spent on paying taxes and complying with rules and laws is extensive. While the 
number of hours spent on paying taxes annually in Senegal is 666, firms in Zambia only use 132 hours 
on paying taxes every year. Six of the nine selected countries are rated below the SSA average (318 
hours) in terms of this indicator. 
Though Zambia has the lowest tax rate of the countries in the sample (14.5%), figures from the 
Enterprise Survey shows that tax rates are seen as the top constraint by firms in Zambia (see Figure 1). 
                                                     
22 Source: Doing Business (2012) 
23 It should be noted that this average is heavily affected by the tax rates in the Comoros, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and The Gambia where tax rates are 218%, 340% and 284%, respectively. When these three 
countries are excluded from the sample, the SSA tax rate average is 41.5%, i.e. lower than the OECD average. 
15 
36 
46 
33 
32 
46 
34 
50 
66 
43 
57 
37 
32 
48 
9 
29 
59 
37 
41 
55 
13 
37 
132 
213 
172 
200 
357 
666 
230 
393 
270 
186 
318 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 
Zambia 
Uganda 
Tanzania 
South Africa 
Sierra Leone 
Senegal 
Mozambique 
Kenya 
Benin 
OECD 
SSA 
Time (hours per year) Payments (number per year) Total tax rate (% profit) 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
18 
The Doing Business and the Enterprise surveys are inadequate to explain why the perception of firms 
are so strongly opposed to the level of the tax rates, even though the Doing Business numbers suggest 
them to be far below the regional and OECD average. 
To sum up, the surveys show that tax rates are viewed as an important obstacle for business in the 
individual countries, as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Furthermore, tax rates are perceived 
to be a much larger obstacle than tax administration. Of non-tax related issues, practises of the 
informal sector and supply of electricity are the most frequently mentioned business constraints 
regionally, but there are substantial differences across countries. Large disparities between countries 
are found in the number of required meetings with tax officials, but also between companies of 
different sizes within countries. The costs associated with tax payments vary extensively between the 
countries. Thus, while providing interesting and useful findings about regional challenges related to 
taxation, cross-country studies are far from sufficient in the study of taxpayer behaviour.        
4.1.2 Country specific business surveys  
A series of country and sector specific surveys have been conducted across Africa. In the following we 
summarise the design and findings of two surveys, which have received attention due to the strength of 
the methodologies and the policy relevant findings. The first is a survey of enterprises in Uganda 
(Gauthier and Reinikka 2001) and the second a survey of small businesses in South Africa (Coolidge 
and Ilic 2009). 
4.1.2.1 Uganda: Shifting tax burdens through exemptions and evasion 
The study by Gauthier and Reinikka (2001) uses detailed information on taxes and firm characteristics 
from a survey of 243 firms in Uganda conducted by the World Bank and the Ugandan Private Sector 
Foundation. Firms were interviewed in 1998 on their activities in 1995-97, including physical 
investment, exports, infrastructure services, taxation, policy credibility, regulation, and corruption. The 
survey requested confidential information on costs, sales, tax payments etc. To obtain cooperation 
from the respondents, the interviews were carried out by the Uganda Manufacturers Association. In 
addition to quantitative data, the survey also collected information on the firms’ perceptions of various 
constraints to investment. 
A stratified random sample for the survey was constructed using the following criteria (Gauthier and 
Reinikka 2001: 5): 
• The sample should be reasonably representative of the population of establishments in five 
major economic sectors.  
• The establishments surveyed should account for a substantial share of national output in each 
of the industrial categories. 
• The sample should be sufficiently diverse in terms of firm size. 
• There should be enough representation outside the capital city Kampala to draw conclusions 
about industrial activity in Uganda as a whole. 
The survey was based on a partial industrial census update from 1996 of the then latest complete 
industrial census in Uganda from 1989. Only 8 out of the 39 districts in the country were included. 
However, despite its limited geographical coverage, the 8 districts in the 1996 update represented 80% 
of value added in the private industrial sector and 70% of employment, based on the 1989 census. 
Large firms represented less than 20% of the sample, while firms with less than 21 employees 
represented 47%. Although the sample was drawn randomly from the 1996 updated industrial census, 
it over-represents larger, more visible firms. This bias is likely to be important when considering the 
tax evasion data. 
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The study shows that tax exemptions and evasion were widespread among businesses in 1995-97. Tax 
evasion was found to be especially prevalent among smaller firms, while larger firms tended to reduce 
their tax obligations through official tax incentive (exemption) programmes, leaving medium-sized 
firms bearing a disproportionate share of the total tax burden. These findings suggest that the inverted 
U-shaped relationship between taxes and size derives from the relationship between tax erosion 
patterns and firm size (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001: 10). That medium-sized firms support the heaviest 
tax burden in proportion to sales suggests that they have a competitive disadvantage relative to smaller 
and larger firms. Domestic-owned firms tended to bear half the tax ratio (4.5%) of foreign firms 
(8.3%) or joint-ownership firms (8.2%) in 1995. The lighter burden of domestic firms was found to be 
mainly due to differences in evasion behaviour, with 64% of domestic firms classified as evaders 
compared to just 40% of foreign-owned firms and 44% of joint-owned firms. 
Firms were also asked about various forms of contacts with the national tax administration, the 
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). For example, they were asked whether they had been audited by 
the URA, and if there were any differences between the firm’s self-declaration and the revenue 
authority’s assessment over the last three years (i.e. in 1995-97). Furthermore, they were asked if they 
had to pay bribes to public officials, including tax collectors, and if so, how much.  
Over 40% of the surveyed firms reported audits for corporate tax, while as many as 75% of VAT-
paying firms reported audits, which are very high shares when compared to other countries. The high 
auditing frequency indicates a serious lack of (quasi-)voluntary compliance and a low level of mutual 
trust between the tax authority and the taxpayer (see Chen and Reinikka (1999). The firms audited for 
corporate tax and VAT were mainly larger, and the firms audited for corporate tax typically did not 
have access to exemptions. Furthermore, half of the firms surveyed challenged their tax assessments. 
The difference between the Uganda Revenue Authority’s assessment and the firm’s self-declaration 
was, on average, 83%. Gauthier and Reinikka (2001: 21) found that the probability of the firms’ own 
assessment being different from that of the tax administration was significant and negatively correlated 
with tax exemptions. In other words, the more exemptions a firm has, the less likely it is to disagree 
with the revenue authority over its tax assessment. 
The sampled firms were asked to rank a number of constraints, including tax administration and tax 
burdens (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001: 18). Tax administration was perceived as the sixth most binding 
constraint overall (out of 24). On average, as many as 64% of the respondents ranked tax 
administration and tax burdens as a major constraint. With regard to customs, 32% of the respondents 
felt it represented a major constraint. Customs-related constraints increased with firm size, reflecting 
the fact that large firms are often importers. 
Finally, firms were asked if they usually paid bribes to tax and customs officers, and if so, the amount 
(Gauthier and Reinikka 2001: 22). Bribe payments to tax officials are a means of gaining favours, and 
especially of reducing tax obligations or payments. As many as 102 of the 237 surveyed firms (43%) 
reported paying bribes to tax officials occasionally to always, while 75 (38%) out of 197 firms 
reported having to pay bribes to customs officials. The frequency increased with firm size. As many as 
60% of the large firms said they paid bribes to tax officials (occasionally to always) compared with 
just 13% of smaller firms. The actual burden of bribe extraction by public officials was found to be 
heaviest for medium-sized firms. 
Gauthier and Reinikkas’ study is interesting both with respect to the rigorous methodology applied and 
with respect to some of the findings. Firstly, it shows that - if properly designed and implemented - it 
is possible to gather quite rather sensitive data on firms’ tax behaviour and attitudes. Second, it 
indicates that businesses’ tax behaviour may differ substantially depending on the company’s size and 
the sector it is operating in.      
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4.1.2.2 South Africa: Tax compliance perceptions and formalisation of small businesses 
The compliance behaviour of small and micro enterprises is receiving increasing attention due to the 
large number of such firms in many African countries, and the perceived untapped tax potential these 
companies represent for governments. This section presents a recent investigation by Coolidge and Ilic 
(2009). The study was initiated in 2006 by the National Treasury (NT) of South Africa and the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) in cooperation with the Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
(FIAS) of the World Bank Group to assess the extent of the tax compliance burden for enterprises in 
South Africa. A set of three surveys were conducted focusing on small, medium and micro enterprises 
(SMMEs): 
1. A survey of professional tax practitioners (TP) about their SMME clients. 
2. A survey of SMME’s registered with SARS. 
3. A survey of informal SMME’s regarding their perceptions of tax compliance costs. 
The survey fieldwork for the third informality survey included 1000 businesses that were not 
registered with SARS. The survey of formal firms included 1000 businesses that were registered with 
SARS. A representative sample was drawn from the SARS database of registered business taxpayers. 
The fieldwork for the two business surveys took place in 2007.  
The surveys aimed to answer, among others, the following questions:  
• What are the characteristics of the 12% of formal firms who reported they had operated for 
some time before registering with SARS? 
• What are the characteristics of the informal firms who reported they are considering 
registering with SARS? 
• Is there a ‘bridge’ that can be found between informal and formal firms? 
• What do informal firms know about their tax obligations? 
• What are some of the key attitudes of informal firms that may be related to their decisions 
about formalizing and registering with SARS? 
The study found that formalisation was more likely to take place in urban areas in South Africa, 
involving relatively larger firms, and those who already used proper bookkeeping. Furthermore, 
informal businesses who said they were likely to register for tax in the near future were more likely 
than other informal firms to:  
• Report higher satisfaction with government services. 
• Believe most businesses should (and do) pay their taxes.  
• Be registered with business associations. 
• Have a relatively larger number of employees. 
• Rent their premises. 
• Keep financial records.  
• Be aware of the location of nearest SARS office. 
Conversely, informal businesses that received most of their income in cash were found to be less likely 
to register for taxation. In addition, those who perceived there to be ‘major problems’ associated with 
crime, infrastructure, and the skills and education of available workers, were relatively less likely to 
register for tax. The most-cited advantages of being registered for taxation included better 
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opportunities for growth, better access to financing, and better access to government services. The 
disadvantages included the financial burden of taxation, and dissatisfaction about government services. 
Coolidge and Ilic’s study provides some insights for policy makers wanting to increase formalisation 
among informal small to medium size businesses. The findings suggest that a complex range of factors 
attract or inhibit firms from registering for taxation. To encourage larger formalisation, the authors’ 
suggest that the South African Revenue Services (SARS) should improve and emphasise government 
services that are high priorities to informal businesses, such as fighting crime and providing 
infrastructure. 
So far, we have looked at taxation from the firm’s point of view. In the following subsections the 
focus is shifted towards studies of the behaviour and attitudes of the individual taxpayer. 
4.2 Country specific citizen surveys   
During the last 10-15 years, citizen surveys have been conducted in several African countries aiming 
to shed light on peoples’ views of taxation and their compliance behaviour. Several of these surveys 
focus on local government taxation. A general characteristic of these studies is that they are 
exploratory, location specific and the samples are not nationwide representative. This section presents 
the design and key findings of some of these surveys. 
4.2.1 Tanzania: Citizens’ tax behaviour and attitudes  
Several surveys examining citizens’ tax behaviour and attitudes have been conducted in Tanzania. 
Most of these studies focus on local government taxes. In the following we present two studies in 
which one of the authors’ of this paper was involved in collaboration with Tanzanian researchers.   
4.2.1.1 Tanzania: Why people pay taxes 
One of the earliest taxpayer surveys in Tanzania was conducted in the mid-1990s (Fjeldstad and 
Semboja 2001). The study attempted to shed light on factors determining tax compliance behaviour in 
local government authorities. The experiences with the per capita (head) tax - locally named 
‘development levy’ - was used as case. Revenues from development levy contributed on average about 
30% of total own revenues in rural councils in 1997, and 19% in urban councils (p. 2059-60).  The 
levy was, in principle, imposed on every person above the age of 18 years who ordinarily resided in 
the area. Women were exempted in many councils. In most areas, the tax was levied on a flat basis, 
but in some urban areas graduated rates based on incomes were applied. 
The study aimed to answer two questions: Firstly, who pays head-tax in local authorities, and 
secondly, why people pay, i.e., to identify the determinants of their compliance behaviour. The study 
tested a set of hypothesis that were derived from theories of (a) economic deterence; (b) fiscal 
exchange; and (c) social influences (see section 2 of this paper; and Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001: 
2016): 
H1 Compliance is more likely the higher income a taxpayer has. 
H2 Compliance is more likely when the probability of prosecution is perceived to be high. 
H3 Compliance is more likely when sanctions against tax evasion are perceived to be        
severe. 
H4 A taxpayer is more likely to comply when he perceives his terms of trade with the 
government as fair. 
H5 The fewer evaders a taxpayer knows, the more likely he himself will comply.  
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The study was carried out in two district councils in late 1996 and mid-1997. The sample was not 
representative. While the respondents were randomly selected from the Tax Register Books of the 
Village Executive Officers and the Ward Executive Officers in one council (Kibaha, 128 respondents 
in four villages), the representativeness of the sample in the second council (Kilosa, 44 respondents in 
three villages) is questionable, both in terms of size and how it was selected (Fjeldstad and Semboja 
2001: 2062-3). For instance, Tax Register Books were unavailable in some of the sampled wards, 
because they had either been stolen or had just disappeared. Thus, lists of names of taxpayers were 
provided on hand-written sheets of paper. The interviews were conducted in Swahili. 
The questionnaire was organised around five main headings (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001: 2063):  
1. Background information on the respondent 
Key data collected was on the main occupation of adult members of the household and the principal 
source of income as these variables are assumed to affect both the opportunity to evade and the ability 
to pay taxes. 
2.  Admitted (non-)compliance 
The respondents were asked if they had paid development levy in each of the two recent years. 
Respondents giving an affirmative answer were then asked about the tax rate paid. 
3.  Tax enforcement 
A series of questions were asked on tax collection procedures, including which part of the council was 
involved and how payment was made. 
4.  Perceptions of others' behaviour 
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of other taxpayers’ behaviour regarding compliance. 
5.  Perceptions of the terms of trade with the government 
To measure perceptions of the terms of trade with the government, a series of questions were asked 
about the quality of public services and the value received in return for tax payment. Emphasis was put 
on the perceived relationship between tax compliance and the provision of public services. 
The study found that the following factors contributed to explain compliance behaviour (Fjeldstad and 
Semboja 2001: 2070):  
Opportunities: Differences in opportunities for evasion mattered, for example, employees paying their 
head-tax through a tax withholding system had lesser opportunities to evade than the self-employed. 
Ability to pay: Some of the relatively better off respondents, in particular migrants and traders, were 
more compliant due to (i) higher opportunity costs connected with evasion, and (ii) because they were 
easily targeted by tax collectors. The opportunity costs of hiding from tax collectors were higher for 
the better off, since hiding “puts one out of business”. Thus, relatively better off persons put less effort 
into hiding, and, therefore, were more accessible to tax enforcers. This finding further implied that the 
head tax was a less regressive tax than what was usually claimed. 
Probability of prosecution: Given the limited administrative resources, it was rational for collectors to 
concentrate on the more accessible and better off taxpayers. In this case the ability to pay and 
accessibility were key variables. 
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Social influences: Knowledge of the compliance behaviour of others seemed to influence the 
taxpayer’s perceived probability of being prosecuted. The larger the fraction of the local population 
that was observed not paying the lower the perceived risk of being prosecuted.   
Severity of sanctions: The way the law was enforced and the severity of sanctions appeared to have 
fuelled tax resistance. This finding contradicts the standard theory which tells us that the more severe 
the sanctions perceived by taxpayers, the higher the compliance expected. The survey results point in 
the opposite direction: The more severe the sanctions, the more widespread the tax resistance. 
According to Fjeldstad and Semboja, the reason for this ‘perverse’ relationship was not entirely clear, 
but, they argued, it could be due to reciprocity considerations. The coercive behaviour of tax collectors 
fostered resistance and disrespect for tax laws. Accordingly, oppressive enforcement and harassment 
by collectors induced tax evasion. Tax evasion could, therefore, to some extent be interpreted as a 
strategy of public resistance and opposition against the authorities.  
Fiscal exchange: Generally, the head tax was perceived to be unfair. Perceptions of exploitation due to 
unfair terms of trade with the government promoted non-compliance. Thus, peoples’ tax resistance 
seemed to be correlated to declining or absence of public service provision. 
The study did not explore the relative strength of the various factors in explaining the observed 
patterns of tax compliance. However, the results suggest that the standard economic influences of tax 
size and detection probability were at work, although other determinants also were essential in 
understanding peoples’ tax behaviour. In particular, the relationship between taxation and service 
provision and how the tax law was enforced seemed to be important. 
Clearly, no findings of statistical significance could be generated by these case studies except 
generating suggested explanations to the tax compliance behaviour observed. Thus, although Fjeldstad 
and Semboja’s analysis is limited by the cases upon which their study was based, it has a more general 
interest and application. 
In a subsequent follow-up study based on the same dataset, Fjeldstad (2001) examined three 
propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. The following results derived from 
the analysis: First, revenue performance depended on the degree of coercion involved in tax 
enforcement. Reciprocity did not seem to be an inherent component of the state-citizen relationship in 
connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depended on the bargaining 
powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, coercive tax 
enforcement was facilitated when the ‘bargaining powers’ with respect to tax collection favoured the 
council administration, and the elected councillors had no direct influence on collection. Third, the 
presence of donors in a local authority was crucial by changing the ‘balance of power’ in favour of the 
council administration, with implications for accountability, responsiveness and democratic 
development.  
The study demonstrated that the involvement of donors at the local level could at least have two 
impacts on tax enforcement: (i) donors’ presence could induce increased tax effort, however, (ii) at the 
expense of accountability and democratic consolidation. Thus, Moore’s (1998) proposition that the 
more a state (in this case a local government) ‘earns’ its income through bureaucratic tax collection, 
the more likely are state-society relations to be characterized by accountability and democracy, was 
not supported by this study. In contrast, increased tax effort was achieved through coercive methods, 
often characterised by violent and extortive forms of enforcement. According to Fjeldstad (2001), 
these results might explain why widespread differences in revenue performance between local 
authorities were observed in Tanzania. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
24 
4.2.1.2 Tanzania: Citizens’ changing views on taxation in Tanzania 
Since 2003, the Tanzanian research institute REPOA (www.repoa.or.tz) has conducted citizens’ 
perception surveys that focus on peoples’ views of public service delivery, governance and taxation. 
So far, three surveys - based on the same questionnaire - have been conducted: the first in 2003, the 
second in 2006, and the third in 2009. Each survey comprised 1260 respondents and covered the same 
localities in four district councils and two urban councils, all located in different regions of the 
country. In each council 210 respondents from 7 villages/mitaa were sampled, i.e. 30 respondents in 
each locality.    
Ideally, the three surveys should have covered the same respondents to secure panel data. However, 
due to practical and financial constraints this was not feasible, according to the research team. The 
respondents were sampled according to the same sampling procedures in each survey. Since the 
selection of wards and villages was random, respondent households were also randomly picked from 
the village/mtaa24
The analytical and conceptual framework applied in these surveys followed the approach suggested by 
Levi (
 registers. In each identified respondent household, any adult over 18 years was 
picked as the appropriate respondent.  
1988; 1997) where the relationship between a taxpayer and the government includes three of the 
theoretically predicted elements outlined in chapter 2 of this paper. First is the element of fiscal 
exchange (see section 2.2). Consequently, citizens’ willingness to pay taxes voluntarily depends on the 
government’s capacity to provide services. Second is the element of coercion, as represented by the 
enforcement activities of tax collectors and the penalties imposed on those detected for non-payment 
(section 2.1). The third element is the impact of social influences and norms on the taxpayer’s 
compliance behaviour (section 2.3).  
The surveys included questions on citizens’ views on: (i) taxation and evasion; (ii) who pays and why; 
(iii) service delivery; (iv) major problems in revenue collection; (v) who is to blame for poor revenue 
collection; and (vi) measures required to improve revenue collection. The respondents were grouped 
according to socio-economic characteristics such as age, gender, size of household, education, 
occupation etc. The data analysis consisted of simple statistical analysis of a step-by-step process, 
starting with frequencies, cross-tabulations combining bi- and multi-variables, and, finally, an 
exploratory analysis of the respondents’ perceptions on taxation and factors explaining compliance.   
Based on the survey data from 2003 and 2006, Fjeldstad et al. (2009) examined what changes – if any 
– could be observed with respect to factors impacting on Tanzanian’s willingness to pay taxes or not? 
What did ordinary people consider to be the major challenges to improving the tax system in 2006 
compared to 2003? To our knowledge, few studies have traced changes in Africans’ perceptions on 
taxation over time, which is surprising since it is likely that peoples’ views will change over time with 
implications for policy design. In the following some of the findings from the 2003 and 2006 surveys 
in Tanzania are summarised.  
In the total sample, almost 88% of the respondents in 2006 reported paying at least one form of taxes, 
fees or user charges in the past two years, though with variations between the councils. This figure was 
substantially higher than the corresponding figures in 2003, when less than 60% of all respondents 
reported paying. The most frequently cited payments in 2006 were various service charges, especially 
school contributions (84%), health costs sharing fees (75%) and water fees (35%). Contributions to the 
Uhuru Torch were also common (47% of the respondents in 2006). As many as 36% of the 
respondents in 2006 said they paid VAT, suggesting increased awareness among citizens of the 
presence of this indirect tax on goods and services.  
                                                     
24 Mtaa is Swahili for ‘hamlet’, i.e. an area in a town or city.  
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While the general level of claimed compliance was higher in 2006 compared to 2003, the relative level 
of compliance between age groups, gender, and levels of education had not changed much. Admitted 
compliance also seemed to increase with the level of education, and was significantly higher among 
respondents who had completed college or university.  
Why did more people claim to pay in 2006 compared to 2003? When asked why people paid taxes and 
fees the responses differed significantly between 2003 and 2006. In 2003, the majority of the 
respondents said people paid because they ‘wanted to avoid disturbances’ (46% of the total sample). 
Fjeldstad et al. (2009) argue that this response reflects that many people at that time perceived the tax 
enforcement regime as being unfair, coercive and demeaning. Three years later, by the end of 2006, 
only 14% of the respondents gave the same response. According to the authors, this dramatic change 
in peoples’ perceptions was most likely due to the local government tax reforms of 2003 and 2004 in 
Tanzania, and in particular due to the abolition of the much detested head tax (‘development levy’). 
Another major change in peoples’ perceptions of the tax regime was related to service delivery. While 
only 23% of the respondents in 2003 said that people paid taxes because they anticipated public 
services, as many as 50% gave this answer in 2006. This change was consistent with peoples’ 
perceptions that public services had improved in Tanzania in recent years. The majority (75%) of the 
respondents of the 2006-survey said they had seen an improvement in service delivery over the past 
two years, particularly in education, health, and law and order. The corresponding figure for 2003 was 
54%.  
Although these surveys provide some interesting findings, in particular on changes over time of 
peoples’ perceptions of the tax system, and the linkage between taxation and the delivery of state 
services, they are essentially exploratory. A major weakness is that the samples are location specific 
and do not reflect a national, representative sample. Further, the statistical analysis is very simple, 
mainly cross-tabulations that identify certain correlations. However, causalities and the relative 
strength of the various factors in explaining the observed patterns of tax compliance remains 
unexplored.  
4.2.2 South Africa: Perceptions of taxation among different population groups 
Oberholzer (2007) examines the perceptions of taxation amongst different groups of South African 
taxpayers. The study aims to determine the various economic, geographic, demographic or other 
factors that might influence a taxpayer’s attitude with regard to general tax-related issues (Oberholzer 
2007)(Oberholzer 2007)(Oberholzer 2007)(Oberholzer 2007). It focused on individual taxpayers. 
Corporate taxpayers were not included.  
The target population for the study consisted of the four different population groups in South Africa 
(i.e. White, Coloured, Indian and African) as defined by Statistics South Africa. A sample was 
selected from the greater Tshwane metropolitan area (which includes the capital city Pretoria). 
According to  Oberholzer (2007: 49) , this target area was selected for practical purposes (e.g. time 
and budget constraints), and also because this area represents a heterogeneous population. 260 
respondents were randomly selected from the target population. Respondents older than 21 years of 
age were included in the sample. As the research was essentially exploratory, statistical hypothesis 
testing was not used. The sample is not representative. Hence, the findings only highlight the various 
perceptions amongst the respondents.  
The study was carried out by means of personal, face-to-face interviews with a structured and semi-
structured questionnaire administered at the respondents’ homes.25
                                                     
25 The methodology applied is presented in Oberholzer (2007: chapter 3).   
 The questionnaire comprised both 
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closed and open-ended questions. Respondents answered closed-ended questions by ticking one box 
representing the views that were the closest to their own. Open ended questions were also incorporated 
to which respondents provided unstructured replies. The questionnaire was designed to take into 
consideration the fact that English is not the first language of the majority of the respondents and that 
only a small number of previously disadvantaged South Africans have had tertiary education.26 The 
respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements that dealt with 
general issues related to tax. In the following we have extracted some of the key findings from study.27
Almost 60% of the respondents disagreed with the statement “I do not know why I have to pay tax”, 
which according to the author, indicates that most of the surveyed people understood the need to 
contribute to the development of South African society via taxes. While a small minority held the view 
that it is ‘unfair’ to pay tax, nearly 75% of the respondents disagreed with this statement. Perceptions, 
however, were quite mixed when it came to receiving value for money from government, with only 
25% believing that the benefits received justified the amount of tax paid. Nearly 40% of the 
respondents believed that the services received from government did not represent value for money. 
Almost 60% of the respondents felt that a substantial portion of all taxes collected were used ‘for 
meaningless purposes’. Furthermore, the vast majority (almost 88%) believed that waste and 
corruption in government was high. These findings may indicate that the ‘fiscal exchange’ argument 
behind taxpayers’ compliance has limited explanatory power in this case. However, it is possible that 
the fiscal exchange argument may still hold given that the majority of people responded that they find 
the principle of paying taxes fair and just, but that the return on their taxes is lacking due to poor 
public service delivery. This may reflect fiscal exchange expectations among the populace: people are 
willing to pay taxes, but perceive they get little in return, partly due to wastage and corruption. 
 
Interestingly, a large share of the respondents (61%) agreed with the statement that the tax authority 
(i.e. the South African Revenue Services) would notice if they evaded taxes. Yet, more than 45% of 
the respondents believed that people evaded tax because the risk to be detected by the tax authority 
was low. Furthermore, as many as 46% of the repondents percived the tax burden to be so heavy that 
many people were forced to evade in order to survive. Still, almost two-thirds (64%) of the 
respondents believed that the wealthy evaded more often than poor people.  
Oberholzer found support for the view of Alm and Torgler (2006) that a sustainable tax system is 
based on a fair tax system and a responsive government. Hence, if taxpayers perceive that their 
preferences are adequately considered, their identification with the government increases and so does 
their willingness to pay taxes. The government should therefore aim to establish a conducive 
environment for tax payment.  
Oberholzer’s study provides some interesting insights on citizens’ views of taxation in South Africa. 
However, it is essentially a case study. The sample is small and location specific, and not 
representative for the country. The statistical analysis is simple, mainly cross-tabulations. Clearly, no 
findings of statistical significance can be generated by this case study except generating suggested 
explanations to the tax compliance behaviour observed. Causalities and the relative strength of the 
various factors in explaining taxpayers’ behaviour and attitudes in South Africa remain unexplored. 
Although Oberholzer’s analysis is limited by the case upon which it is based, it is interesting.  
                                                     
26 MarkData, a private, independent company specialising in designing surveys, health surveys, demographic and 
population surveys, and monitoring surveys, was contracted to aid in conducting the survey (ibid.: 55).  
27 For further details, see Chapter 5 (pp. 100-206) in Oberholzer (2007). 
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4.2.3 South Africa: What’s trust got to do with it?  
Fjeldstad (2004) investigates the reasons for variation in compliance behaviour within and between 
local authorities in South Africa with similar socio-economic characteristics. His dependent variable is 
the non-payment of service charges, despite a major 1995 campaign, the Msakhane campaign, to 
mobilize citizens to pay.28
Levi 1988
 He explicitly sets out to test Levi’s arguments on quasi-voluntary 
compliance ( ; 1997). According to this analytical framework, three dimensions of trust may 
affect compliance: (1) trust in the local government to use revenues to provide expected services; (2) 
trust in the authorities to establish fair procedures for revenue enforcement and distribution of 
services; and (3) trust in other citizens to pay their share of service charges.  
Fjeldstad analysed the results of two comprehensive national surveys, which explicitly focused on 
payment of municipal services. These surveys had been conducted by the Centre for Development 
Support (CDS) at the University of the Free State, and by the Helen Suzman Foundation, respectively. 
The CDS survey (Centre for Development Support 2001) was carried out in 2000, and covered 1600 
households in 32 localities across South Africa. Both rural and urban sites were included. The Helen 
Suzman Foundation survey (Johnson 1999) was conducted in late 1998, and covered 1754 respondents 
in various urban councils known to have high levels of non-compliance (795 respondents in Gauteng, 
326 in other cities, and 633 in smaller towns). In both surveys, the respondents were grouped 
according to socio-economic characteristics such as type of housing (ownership), language, size of the 
household, and income. The surveys included questions on service delivery, e.g. changes over time for 
better or for worse, perceptions of the capacity and effectiveness of municipalities in providing 
services (implicitly the trustworthiness of the local authorities), the role of community leaders, 
perceptions of the rate level (i.e. ability to pay), perceptions of why (some) people did not pay, 
perceptions of others’ compliance behaviour (i.e., implicitly trust in others), and how to deal with 
defaulters (i.e. credibility of sanctions). Combined, the two surveys provide an extensive database on 
citizens’ perceptions and attitudes with respect to service delivery, community development and the 
non-payment of service charges in local authorities. 
Fjeldstad (2004) concluded that ‘ability to pay’, although a factor, was not determinant of compliance 
behaviour with respect to payment of service charges. However, he found that two dimensions of trust 
seemed to affect citizens’ compliance. Firstly, the survey data supported the proposition that the 
trustworthiness of the revenue enforcement mechanisms and the penalties imposed on defaulters 
affected citizens’ compliance behaviour. Yet, in a number of cases the way the law was enforced and 
the severity of sanctions appeared to have contributed to undermine trust in local authorities and 
fuelled resistance: the more severe the sanctions, the more widespread and organised resistance to 
paying rates and charges. Fjeldstad found that excessive use of sanctions and force was more likely to 
fuel resistance than compliance. Thus, non-payment could to some extent, according to the author, be 
interpreted as a strategy of public resistance and opposition against the authorities. 
Secondly, trust in other citizens to pay their share seemed to be important. The data supported the 
proposition that social influences affected compliance. In particular, knowledge of the compliance 
behaviour of others seemed to influence the perceived probability of being detected for non-payment. 
The larger the fraction of the local population that was observed not paying the lower was the 
perceived risk of being prosecuted. The attitude of local political leaders with respect to payment was 
also found to be important, for instance by legitimising non-payment through their own behaviour. 
Furthermore, the interaction between social networks and overlapping collective activities had in some 
instances, such as in Soweto with respect to electricity charges, provided a framework in which it was 
difficult for individuals to pay their charges without provoking reactions from their non-paying 
                                                     
28 The campaign was launched by the South African Government in February 1995. The overall aim of the 
Masakhane campaign, meaning ‘let us build together’, was to normalise governance and the provision of basic 
services at the local level. 
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neighbours and other members of the community. Fjeldstad also found that procedural fairness and the 
existence of a social norm to comply increased quasi-voluntary compliance. Hence, (non-)compliance 
is not only a question of state-society relationships, but also a question of relationships between 
citizens and/or between groups of citizens within local communities. Considerations of these issues 
might shed light on the observed differences between and within local authorities with respect to 
service charge compliance, and factors determining citizens’ compliance behaviour. 
The data analysed did not provide clear linkages between payment and service delivery, i.e. the fiscal 
exchange proposition. However, there seemed to be a perception among respondents that the quality of 
services had deteriorated in recent years. Fjeldstad (2004) argues that if this perception persists and is 
fortified, this may have an impact on future willingness to pay, and lead to a further erosion of 
people’s trust in the government’s capacity to provide expected services.  
Considerations of these issues may shed light on the observed differences between and within local 
authorities with respect to service charge compliance, and factors determining citizens’ compliance 
behaviour. However, Fjeldstad’s findings would have been more compelling if he had provided 
contingency table analysis, regressions or factor analysis.   
4.3 Cross-country citizen surveys  
A small but growing body of literature assesses attitudes and behaviours of African citizens towards 
taxation using cross-country surveys. Much of this literature draws data from the Afrobarometer-
series. Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project which consists of national 
sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected countries towards democracy, markets, civil 
society and other aspects of development.29
The Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on 
a regular cycle. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be 
systematically compared. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over time. Results are shared with 
decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, journalists, researchers, donors and investors, as 
well as Africans who wish to become more informed and active citizens. Thus far, four rounds of the 
survey have been conducted, while the fifth is currently being implemented: 
 Data from nationally representative surveys offer an 
opportunity to disaggregate the results and study citizens’ perceptions of and attitudes toward taxation 
across various political and social subgroups. 
• Round 1: conducted from July 1999 through June 2001 and covered 12 countries. 
• Round 2: conducted from May 2002 through October 2003 in 16 countries (the Zimbabwe 
survey was carried out in April and May 2004). 
• Round 3: conducted in 18 countries from March 2005 through February 2006. 
• Round 4: took place in 19 countries between March 2008 and June 2009. 
• Round 5: started in the second half of 2011 and is expected to be completed by end 
2012/early 2013. It will cover at least 25 countries. In addition, Afrobarometer expects to 
collaborate with Arab Barometer to include several North African countries.  
                                                     
29 The Afrobarometer is a collaborative enterprise of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana), the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy 
(IREEP) with the support of Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Cape Town Centre for 
Social Science Research (UCT/CSSR). More details are provided at www.afrobarometer.org  
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The samples are drawn using multi-stage, stratified, area cluster probability sample.30
In a paper entitled Why do citizens assent to pay tax? Legitimacy, taxation and the African state, 
 The sample is 
designed as a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. Random 
selection is used at every stage of sampling and the sample is stratified and datasets are weighted to 
ensure that all major demographic segments of the population are represented. Sample size varies from 
a minimum of 1200 in each country to up to 2400 or more. 
D'Arcy (2011) analyses three theoretical models - fiscal exchange, national political community and 
comparative treatment - to explain tax compliance in several African countries using Afrobarometer 
Round 3 (2005-06) data. The results provide limited support for fiscal exchange, no support for 
national community approaches and considerable support for the comparative treatment thesis. 
Moreover, D’Arcy finds that to earn the right to collect tax the state must fulfil its adjudicatory role by 
providing a judicial system that citizen’s trust, i.e. a fair state that arbitrates equally among its citizens. 
In addition, although less important, the state must be responsive and seen to be addressing citizen 
needs through the delivery of services. Overall, D’Arcy finds that the state must be impartial, fair and 
responsive before African citizens agree to the normative values that underpin taxation. According to 
D'Arcy (2011), meeting these duplicate roles assures the state greater legitimacy and in turn citizens’ 
acceptance regarding the state’s right to tax citizens. 
The first critique of the study is that the empirical analysis omits two major theoretical explanations 
rooted in the literature, i.e. economic deterrence or coercion and social influences and networks (see 
section 2 of this paper). Thus, the results are not fully conclusive and only test three of the five 
theoretical possibilities.  
A second critique concerns the operationalization of the comparative treatment thesis and the choices 
of variables that are used to test this thesis. The variables used are: (i) ethnic treatment; (ii) trust in 
courts, and (iii) equal enforcement. The first assumes that ethnicity is the key social division in all the 
African countries analysed. However, in some countries social cleavages may instead be based along 
regional, religious, linguistic, racial, or class-based lines, and these are not accounted for. Perceptions 
about preferential treatment of ethnic groups take on this bias only when ethnic group identities are 
politicized in a country. In addition, the results find that ethnic discrimination undermines the assent to 
pay tax in only a small number of countries. Yet, the paper does not examine why this is the case, for 
instance by examining in which countries ethnicity is a determinant of access to political and/or 
economic power. The second variable does not tap preferential treatment at all, but instead is a gauge 
for institutional trust in the judicial system. The third variable taps perceptions of government’s 
enforcement and monitoring capacities and not their preferential treatment.  
The third, and primary, concern relates to the operationalization of the dependent variable. The author 
uses the item: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The 
tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes. First, the paper does not test 
compliance, but uses instead assent or willingness to pay taxes. Second, the item used does not 
                                                     
30 Sampling and measurement error are reduced in a number of ways. Firstly, the use of identical or similar item 
wording across surveys minimizes measurement errors. Secondly, the sampling frame, method of sampling and 
sample size are all sufficiently similar to make comparisons over time valid and reduce sampling and 
measurement error. The survey samples are drawn using a multistage clustered random probability sample, 
which were disproportionally stratified by province, population group, and community size. A combination of 
the two types of sampling ensures thorough sampling practise. Multistage cluster sampling deals with drawbacks 
inherent in other sampling alternatives, which are of limited use on their own when sampling a geographically 
dispersed population and when no easily available sampling frames (a list of the population elements) exist. 
Stratification techniques ensure maximum representativeness, whilst being able to reduce the number of clusters 
used. This is done by dividing each level of cluster, district, area etc. into the various strata and then employing 
random selection within each stratum.  
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necessarily tap whether people agree to pay tax (or assent to taxes) as D’Arcy assumes. The item taps 
whether people believe the taxation department has the right to collect taxes. 
Since the validity and reliability of the choice of variables is under question, especially those for which 
the paper finds the most compelling evidence (comparative treatment by the state) the results should 
be approached with caution.  
Finally, D'Arcy (2011) assumes that political legitimacy is the outcome of a process of compliance and 
assent towards taxation. However, it may be that causation works the other way around. In other 
words, a high level of trust and legitimacy is earned by the state in other ways (performance delivery 
of goods, credible leadership etc.) and this legitimacy generates positive attitudes towards compliance 
and taxation generally. 
In contrast to D'Arcy (2011) who found limited support for fiscal exchange, Sacks (2012) finds, in an 
article entitled Can Donors and Non-State Actors Undermine Citizens’ Legitimating Beliefs?, evidence 
supporting the fiscal contract theory in a wide variety of African countries. Sacks uses Afrobarometer 
Round 4 (2008/09) data31
In addition, 
 from 19 sub-Saharan African countries. The cross-national analysis links 
citizens' legitimating beliefs (measured by a willingness to defer to the tax department, the police and 
the Courts) to a government's fulfilment of a fiscal contract. Citizens who are satisfied with their 
government's provision of services and goods are more likely to be willing to defer to the tax 
department, courts and police than citizens who are dissatisfied with government service provision. 
There is also evidence that the more competent, honest and fair a government is in serving its citizens, 
the more likely it is to produce a virtuous cycle of citizen compliance with its extractions, leading to 
better government and greater compliance. 
Sacks (2012) addresses the question about whether the provision of services by donors and 
non-state actors is strengthening, rather than undermining, the relationship and contract between 
citizens and the state. The study finds that across a wide range of African countries, including fragile 
states like Liberia and stronger states like Botswana and South Africa, donors and non-state actors are 
strengthening, rather than undermining, citizens' legitimating beliefs, as measured by their willingness 
to defer to the tax department, the police and the courts. Citizens who believe that donors and non-
state actors, including domestic and international NGOs and international businesses, are doing much 
to help their country, rather than a little, are more likely to be willing to defer to the tax department.  
The analysis is thorough, and by definition most compelling. It uses a dependent variable32
However, some questions arise regarding the theoretical and operational choice of independent 
variables, and therefore, by definition, also question some of the findings. For instance, 
 that taps 
acceptance of the government's right to make people pay taxes, but cautions that this does not 
necessarily tap compliance per se. The predictor variables tap citizens’ experiences of paying taxes, 
perceptions of government effectiveness, perceptions of administrative competence and honesty, and 
procedural justice, plus controls for relevant socio-demographic variables. Due to a binary dependent 
variable the analysis employs probit and logistic regressions techniques.  
D'Arcy (2011) 
makes a distinction between the fiscal exchange and comparative treatment thesis, for which she finds 
considerable support. She tests the latter thesis using the item, which asks how often their ethnic group 
is treated unfairly by their government. Sacks (2012) uses the same item, but interprets it as an 
indicator of procedural justice. Yet, support for this preferential treatment variable in Sacks’ paper 
lends credence to the preferential treatment theoretical exposition, but this is not noted in her study. 
                                                     
31 Afrobarometer Round 4 used a pooled, cross-country sample with a weighted sample of 24,000 respondents 
that reflects equally weighted national country samples at n = 1200.  
32 The dependent variable is whether respondents agree with the statement: “The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes." 
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This variation in interpretation of survey items raises a fundamental issue regarding measurement 
validity and reliability, a hallmark of survey research. This is addressed below; suffice to note here 
that greater consensus is required on the operationalization of concepts within the taxation literature.  
Bratton (2010), which uses Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008/09) data, entitled Citizen perceptions of 
local government responsiveness in sub-Saharan Africa (May 2010), examines whether leadership 
responsiveness is susceptible to popular political behaviour.33
A key finding is that tax compliance is weakly connected to responsiveness (measured by a leaders 
willingness to register the preferences of their constituents), and thus to representation and 
accountability. Bratton asserts that there is little evidence of a positive link between taxation (or the 
number of taxes or fees citizen’s pay) and representation.
 The paper tests three types of mass 
behaviour: (i) citizen activism; (ii) tax payment; and (iii) offers of bribes. Questions addressed by 
Bratton include: By what active means do citizens hold leaders accountable? And does taxation help to 
obtain responsiveness and representation?  
34
Bratton argues that this finding has significant implications for political accountability in Africa. Tax 
compliance will not necessarily generate the responsiveness among rulers that citizens seek. Instead, 
his findings demonstrate that local government responsiveness is much more associated with political 
activism between elections and voting.  
  African citizens who complied with tax 
payments are not more likely to insist on responsive governance and accountable local leadership.  
Yet, Bratton (2010) finds, contrary to expectations, that a citizen’s experience as a victim of corruption 
leads to perceptions of more, not less, responsive leadership. Weak, but significant statistical evidence 
suggests that bribe giving to local councillors generates perceptions that they are responsive. In sum, 
offers of bribes to officials generate a rise in political responsiveness. This link has perverse 
implications - corruption disrupts the taxation-representation rule between citizens and state. 
Corruption partially displaces taxation in linking people and leaders, and this finding should become a 
priority concern for African policy makers at local government level.  
Bratton’s paper appears theoretically and methodologically sound. Its limitations from our perspective 
are that it only addresses local government and does not reflect on national data and tax as an 
aggregate. The study therefore overlooks the possibility that there may be a much stronger association 
between tax compliance and political/leader responsiveness and accountability at the national or 
regional level. Local governments are notoriously weak across many African states compared to their 
respective national governments in terms of tax collection, service delivery and accountability 
(Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012). It may be that citizens do not perceive that responsiveness will come 
from local governments. This limitation could have been dealt with to some extent by using the item in 
Afrobarometer Round 4 that asks respondents to choose which level of government (central, local, 
etc.) has primary responsibility for collecting income taxes. This finding (which level of government is 
perceived to have the bigger tax base) could then be used to assess responsiveness. Moreover, the 
paper does not isolate the effects of the political design of a country, where the role of the national 
government and the executive powers are stronger compared to their local counterparts. Thus, Bratton 
(2010) cannot draw any definitive conclusions about the presence or absence of a fiscal contract 
between citizen and state in these African societies.  
                                                     
33 Dependent Variable = are leaders responsive? How much of the time do you think elected local government 
councilors try their best to listen to what people like you have to say? Ordinal scale: never, only sometimes, 
often, or always. 
34 Independent Variable = Scale of Tax payment = taxation variable is an additive scale of number of taxes paid 
–number of taxes reportedly paid by each respondent. 
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A third study by Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009), entitled, Conceptualizing legitimacy, measuring 
legitimating beliefs, draws on Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005-06) data. The authors find considerable 
statistical evidence of a link between the extent of the trustworthiness of government and procedural 
justice and citizens’ willingness to defer to the police, courts and tax department in a number of 
African countries. In addition, they maintain that perceptions of trust and justice elicit a sense of 
obligation or willingness to obey authorities (value based legitimacy), which is likely to translate into 
compliance (behavioural legitimacy). Their analysis suggests that the more trustworthy and fair the 
government, the more likely its population will develop legitimating beliefs that lead them to accept 
the government’s right to make people obey law and regulations.  
Of all the factors measured, administrative competence is found to be the most important (which 
includes taxation variables), followed by procedural justice (fair treatment of citizens and own ethnic 
group). Government performance is third in importance. Thus, overall, citizens develop a sense of 
duty/obligation towards the government and an acceptance of the government’s right to extract 
personal wealth based on their perceptions of government efficiency, competence and fairness of 
enforcement, as well as ensuring the state administer rules in a fair and unbiased manner among 
citizens, including their ethnic identity group. This means more than government performance. 
Levi et al. (2009) make use of a variable which taps assent to pay taxes, or in their words, “the sense 
of obligation or willingness’ to pay taxes as one of three interrelated dependent variables. “The tax 
department always has the right to make people pay taxes”. The other two similar dependent variables 
tap willingness to obey police and the courts, respectively. Again, in a similar fashion to D'Arcy 
(2011), the authors interpret this variable as one that captures citizens’ willingness or obligation to 
obey or comply with taxation. However, as discussed above this variable may act as an indicator of 
such, but cannot be assumed to tap this directly. 
The two explanatory variables, trustworthy government and procedural justice, used in the analysis by 
Levi et al. (2009) include a range of taxation items. In order to measure trustworthy government the 
authors operationalise an indicator ‘administrative competence’ which taps three issues: (i) citizens 
perception of corruption (honesty) among tax officials; (ii) the enforcement of taxes for non- 
compliers; and (iii) enforcement of tax evaders among top government officials. Yet, they do not use 
any institutional trust items available in the Afrobarometer surveys. Moreover, one could argue that 
these particular items also tap similar other concepts and theories such as perceptions of the 
government’s enforcement and monitoring capacities, some elements of economic deterrence and 
political accountability theories. Again, the choice of variables to operationalise concepts used 
frequently in taxation research are seemingly used interchangeably and without due regard to the 
existing literature that employs well-established measures and offers guidance on conceptual 
clarification. 
Levi et al. (2009) operationalise procedural justice by using variables that indicate whether 
respondents believe the government treats citizens fairly and whether they believe the government 
treats members of their own ethnic group fairly. Their notion of procedural justice and the link 
between that and assent (willingness) to pay taxes is essentially a test of the comparative treatment 
theory. Yet, it is not recognized in the paper as such. 
Perhaps the most substantive critiques of the small body of research that employs cross-country 
African surveys can be condensed as follows: 
Scope of variables: The number of taxation related questions in Afrobarometer Rounds (prior to 
Round 5) is not substantial and do not offer suitable items with which to test the major competing 
theoretical schools of thought. Thus, it is difficult to expect thorough empirical investigations from an 
existing body of literature. The Afrobarometer Round 5 includes many more and more detailed 
taxation items and will therefore go a long way to addressing this shortfall. 
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Measurement validity and reliability: Scholars usually develop standard ways of asking questions 
about a range of concepts in their sub-discipline. The development of these standard indicators has led 
to a process of consensus or ‘harmonisation’ in survey analysis on different areas of interest. The 
indicators usually selected for operationalisation by scholars closely reflects choices made in well-
known studies that aim to test the same concepts. However, it seems that there are few well-
established measures and little consensus regarding which are appropriate variables for 
operationalisation in the existing research on taxation. The literature that uses African data could build 
validity by reverting to the wider literature that outlines the established tradition of variable usage and 
which has dealt at length with processes of conceptual clarification, as well as indicator development 
and evaluation.  
4.4 Advantages and disadvantages of survey research  
The strengths of perception surveys include their ability to capture a broad range of explanatory 
variables known only to taxpayers, notably their understanding of compliance requirements, relevant 
values and attitudes, expectations of risks and benefits of non-compliance. Disadvantages include 
variations in definitions of issues such as non-compliance, the integrity of the answers for deliberate or 
inadvertent reasons, and the inability to report on inadvertent omissions. Surveys may also be 
controversial in countries where the political contest is oppressive and tax authorities are unwilling to 
invite criticism of their integrity, public acceptance, and effectiveness (OECD 2001). In the following, 
we briefly summarise advantages and disadvantages of this methodological approach to shed light on 
peoples’ behaviour and attitudes towards the tax system.  
Survey research provides data for studies of this nature by allowing us to obtain attitudinal information 
directly from different individuals who are selected according to scientific sampling procedures to 
provide a basis for making inferences about some larger population to which they belong.  
Another advantage of survey analysis is that it allows one to perform descriptive research, by 
describing the characteristics of a large set of cases, and explanatory research by looking at variations 
in a certain variable across cases and examining other characteristics systematically linked to the 
variation to draw causal inferences. Moreover, because surveys collect data systematically, 
comparative analysis of the same variables in different populations (or countries) can be made. In 
contrast, other research methodologies, such as case-studies and experimental methods, do not possess 
the distinguishing feature of ‘co-variation’ (that variation in one variable is matched with variation in 
another), and thus lack the statistical methods developed for survey analysis. Public opinion and 
perception surveys also provide a much larger number of cases than that normally obtained with in-
depth interviews. A large sample is essential if one wants to make intergenerational comparisons or 
control for social factors. Large samples also enable representativeness and inference, which are 
important if one is studying a nation or society.  
A drawback of using once off survey data in a study of this nature, and not longitudinal data, is that 
one relies on only one set of data and cannot compare cross-sectional surveys. Therefore one cannot 
explore or reveal changes in attitudes or behaviour over time. However, surveys that are repeated in 
the same countries or communities over time, using the same sampling procedures, may allow for time 
comparisons. But, a drawback of using survey data in some African countries is that it is often difficult 
to obtain a truly representative sample, as reflected in some of the studies reviewed in this section, 
because of uneven access to certain geographical areas or uneven response rates among different 
social groups or classes. However, such challenges can be accommodated. For instance, the 
Afrobarometrer surveys that are repeated every three years are weighted to account for regional, racial 
and other demographic considerations (see section 6.1).  
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5. Concluding remarks  
Understanding taxpayer compliance remains a challenging and unresolved problem. A part of the 
problem appears to have been the search for one overarching model of taxpayer compliance that 
allows predictions to be made about the taxpaying population as a whole (McKerchar and Evans 
2009:179). However, as argued by Alm et al. (1992), individuals exhibit much diversity in their tax 
behaviour. Some people are primarily worried about getting caught and penalised; others are more 
concerned about the behaviour of other taxpayers (or neighbours or business competitors); others think 
in terms of civic duty and/or public services and may weigh those considerations against the perceived 
accountability and efficiency of the state (Ritsema et al. 2003: 16; Coolidge and Ilic 2009: 4). Such 
different factors are all likely to vary across different countries, institutions, and cultures.  
More systematic and coherent information on taxpayer attitudes and behaviour are required for better 
analysis and more informed tax policy design in Africa. Understanding how taxpayers think about and 
experience taxation may provide an essential diagnostic of the political realities for tax reform. For 
instance, attempts to broadening the tax base require better understanding of how the large majority of 
citizens perceive the tax system, whether people perceive they are paying taxes or not, what they 
eventually pay, their views on tax administration and enforcement, and whether and how their tax 
behaviour is correlated with how they perceive the state. Attitude and perception surveys of current 
and potential taxpayers may also help to identify perceived weaknesses of the tax system, as well as to 
enable tax authorities to focus attention efficiently on high-risk categories of taxpayers.  
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6. Moving forward: an agenda for research  
Continued work in this area should focus on enhancing our understanding of taxpayer experiences, 
through a combination of survey and case study evidence, and possibly also through experimental 
studies. The surveys in particular should allow for as broad an exploration as possible by including a 
wide range of valid indicators that will allow for multiple tests of theoretical possibilities.  
The insights generated in this way will not only inform tax policy and reform strategies, but will also 
provide a lens into differences in taxpayer experiences across groups (e.g. gender, age, level of 
education, rural-urban location, ethnicity) and into understanding the micro basis for connections 
between tax payment and broader demands for improved governance.  Different survey instruments 
should be considered, including:  
Tailored surveys for segments of taxpayers 
• Enabling tax authorities to focus attention efficiently on high-risk categories of taxpayers. 
Nationally representative surveys 
• Opportunity to disaggregate the results and study citizens’ perceptions of and attitudes 
towards taxation across various political and social subgroups. 
• Opportunity to gain better understanding of citizens views of different types of taxes in 
different regions. 
• Possibility to analyse causal relationships behind perceptions of taxation.  
• Identify segments in society where perceptions of taxation are more or less prevalent. 
Cross-country surveys 
• Enabling comparison between countries.  
Other regions than Sub-Saharan Africa  
• Enable comparisons of African data with other regional findings from Asia, Europe, Latin 
America and elsewhere. 
The International Centre for Tax and Development (www.ICTD.ac) has commissioned the organisers 
of the 2011-2012 round of the Afrobarometer survey to include a series of questions about tax in the 
following 13 countries: Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.35
6.1 Testing new research boundaries: Afrobarometer Round 5  
 Further, ICTD’s research team suggests 
triangulating some of the findings from the Afrobarometer survey with more detailed and tailored 
surveys in some of these countries. 
The new Afrobarometer Round 5 (fielded in 2011 and 2012) will allow for a more comprehensive 
empirical analysis of taxation theory in African societies using nationally representative public opinion 
survey data from the selected African countries (see section 4.3 above).  
The quantitative data can be tested using at least two alternative dependent variables: 
                                                     
35 At present (October 2012), there is some uncertainty with respect to when the survey data from Cameroon, 
Ghana, Malawi and Mali will be available.  
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1. Compliance – an act or behavioural variable 
2. Assent – an attitudinal variable that measures the normative aspect of taxation 
The tax questions that are included in the Afrobarometer questionnaires in the selected countries are 
framed around a set of hypothesis on taxpayer’s behaviour deriving from the literature on tax 
compliance and governance discussed in previous sections of this paper and listed below. In addition, 
the data will allow for an interrogation of the five ‘schools of thought’ on determinants of tax 
compliance (see section 2 above). 
6.1.1 Economic deterrence  
Research questions derived from the theory:  
• How do citizens perceive the tax collection regime? 
• Is it perceived to as reasonable, fair and in accordance with the accepted standards of society, 
or is it perceived to be corrupt, oppressive and non-transparent? 
• How do people perceive the credibility or trustworthiness of the revenue administration’s 
sanctions against defaulters?  
Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008-09) does not allow for thorough investigation of ‘economic deterrence’. 
Round 5 (2011-12) will allow for a more thorough testing of the economic deterrence theory by 
providing data on two related tax avoidance/ evasion variables (which can be combined into a single 
scale): 
Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to do the following: To avoid paying the income 
or property taxes that you owe to government?  
What do you think is the main reason that some people avoid paying government the taxes and fees 
that they owe? (We are especially interested in the share of respondents answering “People don’t avoid 
paying” and “They know they will not be caught”) 
The first variable is an indicator of the ease of avoiding taxes. Responses to this question are likely to 
be related to citizens’ perception of the probability of getting caught and sanctioned if one evades 
taxes. If those who think it is easy to avoid paying taxes are less compliant or is less willing to pay 
taxes than those who think it is difficult, this could be seen as an indication that the economic 
deterrence theory is relevant to take into account in efforts to broaden the tax base. In a similar 
fashion, variable two gives an indication of the probability of getting caught if avoiding taxes.  
6.1.2 Fiscal exchange 
Research question derived from the theory:  
• Do citizens’ attitudes towards taxation depend on their perceptions about the state’s delivery 
of services (political, social and economic) and the incumbent’s performance?  
This question will also be interrogated by looking at urban versus rural citizens. The assumption is that 
citizens in urban areas in African countries are more likely to experience higher levels of social 
services, jobs, and political governance. Is this delivery linked to (positive) attitudes to paying taxes? 
Afrobarometer Round 5 includes a range of items that tap different elements of fiscal exchange theory, 
which are not contained in the earlier Round 4:  
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 2:  
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• Statement 1: Citizens must pay their taxes to the government in order for our country to 
develop.  
• Statement 2:  The government can find enough resources for development from other sources 
without having to tax the people. 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 2:  
• Statement 1: It is better to pay higher taxes, if it means that there will be more services 
provided by government.  
• Statement 2:  It is better to pay lower taxes, even if it means there will be fewer services 
provided by government. 
Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to do the following: Find out how government 
uses the revenues from people’s taxes and fees? 
What do you think is the main reason that some people avoid paying government the taxes and fees 
that they owe? (We are especially interested in the responses “The services they receive from 
government” and “Government wastes tax money”). 
The first two variables are indicators of the degree to which citizens recognize the link between public 
service provision and tax, and are thus useful in the empirical investigation of the fiscal exchange 
theory. For instance, one can look at the relationship between the responses to the two variables and 
(self-reported) compliance. A positive relationship between answering “statement 1” and compliance 
would for instance be an indication of fiscal exchange being important to compliance: those who 
recognize that tax revenue is needed for development of the country and who think it is worth paying 
higher taxes for more public services are more likely to pay taxes. Answers to the last question, that 
inquires about reasons for tax avoidance, can be used and interpreted in a similar fashion as the first 
two. 
Responses to the question about the ease of finding out how the government spends tax money can 
also be used to examine whether attitudes and compliance is related to how the government spends tax 
revenue. We would then expect to find people to be more compliant if they think it is easy to find out 
how the government spends tax money. 
A number of additional variables common to all Afrobarometer surveys can be used to explore fiscal 
exchange theory through correlations with assent and compliance or acting as control variables in 
multivariate analyses: 
• Government performance evaluations: economic trends  
• Government policy performance (all policies) 
• Incumbent job approval 
• Supply of democracy 
• Demand for democracy  
6.1.3 Social influences 
Research questions derived from the theory:  
• How often do people avoid paying the taxes that they owe the government? 
• Are people’s tax behaviour influenced by the perceived behaviour of others? 
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The following questions included in Afrobarometer Round 5 might help shed light on the above stated 
research questions: 
Do you think the following action by others is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong 
and punishable: Not paying the taxes they owe on their income? 
How often, in this country, do people avoid paying taxes that they owe to the government? 
The question about how often the respondents believe that fellow citizens avoid taxes can be used to 
see if people’s tax behaviour is influenced by the perceived behaviour of others. In the social influence 
framework we expect to find a positive relationship between self-reported compliance and faith in 
other peoples compliance.  
Afrobarometer Round 5 includes several items that tap social influences, which are not contained in 
the earlier Round 4. Demographic variables found in all rounds of the surveys can be used to 
disaggregate groups to assess if group attitudes and behaviour towards taxation are common to 
particular social groups or geographical regions. 
6.1.4 Comparative treatment 
Research questions derived from the theory:  
• How do people perceive they are treated by the state/tax administration relative to those who 
are in their community? 
• How often do people avoid paying the taxes that they owe the government? 
• How often is your ethnic group unfairly treated by the government? 
The literature on comparative tax treatment in Africa (D’Arcy 2010) use three items, common to 
Afrobarometer surveys, that tap equal enforcement of taxation compliance by both citizens and top 
officials, and ethnic preferential treatment. The Afrobarometer Round 5 survey includes the ethnic 
treatment item, but not the others. Ethnic treatment can be measured by the following question: 
How often is your ethnic group treated unfairly by the government?  
The relationship between perceptions of treatment and discrimination based on ethnicity by 
government is fairly limited. However, while the ethnic preferential treatment variable presents a 
sound basis upon which to start to investigate this theoretical explanation, additional variables that tap 
other social divisions and that could explain the basis for preferential treatment also need to be 
considered. 
6.1.5 Political legitimacy 
Connected to the fiscal exchange theory is the notion that the more accountable the government is with 
taxpayers’ money, the more legitimate its actions become. In turn, citizens become increasingly 
willing to assent to and comply with taxation requirements.  
Research questions derived from the theory are:  
• Are people more compliant when they feel that the government is politically legitimate? 
• Is there a relationship between attitudes towards democracy and  attitudes towards taxation? 
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• Is there a relationship between citizen’s perceptions of government accountability and 
attitudes towards taxation? 
Afrobarometer Round 5 includes a range of items that tap different elements of political and 
accountability and legitimacy: 
Institutional trust:  How much do you trust the tax department? 
Responsiveness and government accountability: Which of the following statements is closest to your 
view? Choose Statement 1 or 2:  
• Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how 
his government spends taxpayers’ money. 
• Statement 2: The President should be able to devote his attention to developing the country 
rather than wasting time justifying his actions. 
Corruption: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or have you 
not heard enough about them to say? Tax officials, like Ministry of Finance officials or Local 
Government tax collectors. 
If political legitimacy is an important determinant of tax behaviour, we should expect a positive 
relationship between trust in the tax department and self-reported compliance. Within this framework 
we will also expect that those who think “the President does not need to justify how (s)he spends tax 
money”, and “that many tax officials are involved in corruption” are less likely to be compliant than 
those who think otherwise. 
6.1.6 Sociological variables  
In addition to testing the different theoretical frameworks, the survey also includes a number of 
sociological of interest that could be used to answer the following remaining questions: 
• Are there differences in perceptions between age groups, gender, peoples’ level of education, 
occupation, ethnicity, and religion?  
• What is the geographical reach of the tax system in a particular country (urban-rural, 
provinces etc.)? 
6.1.7 Benefits of the Afrobarometer data and survey question design 
Above, we have presented some of the many variables included in Afrobarometer Round 5 and 
explained how they can be used to examine determinants of tax compliance and taxpayer behaviour. 
The data will allow us to test different hypotheses while controlling for a wide range of background 
variables. Because Afrobarometer poses identical questions across countries, we will also be able to 
make credible cross country comparisons. In sum, the analysis of data from Afrobarometer Round 5 is 
likely to provide much needed knowledge about citizens’ perceptions, attitudes and behaviour with 
respect to taxation in Africa.  
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
40 
References 
Allingham, M. G. & A. Sandmo 1972. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of 
Public Economics, 1, 323-338. 
Alm, J., J. Martinez-Vazquez & B. Torgler 2005. Russian attitudes toward paying taxes – 
before, during, and after the transition. Working Paper Series. International Center for 
Public Policy. 
Alm, J., G. H. McClelland & W. D. Schulze 1992. Why do people pay taxes? Journal of 
Public Economics, 48, 21-38. 
Alm, J. & B. Torgler 2006. Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in 
Europe. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, 224-246. 
Andreoni, J., B. Erard & J. Feinstein 1998. Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, 
36, 818-860. 
Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation, New York, Basic Books. 
Bahiigwa, G., F. Ellis, O. H. Fjeldstad & V. Iversen 2004. Rural taxation in Uganda: 
Implications for growth, income distribution, local government revenue and poverty 
reduction. EPRC Research Series No. 35 (January 2004). Kampala: Economic Policy 
Research Centre. 
Banerjee, A. V. 1992. A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
107, 797-817. 
Bates, R. H. & D.-H. D. Lien 1985. A note on taxation, development, and representative 
government. Politics & Society, 14, 53-70. 
Becker, G. 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political 
Economy, 76, 167-217. 
Bird, R. M. 1989. The administrative dimension of tax reform in developing countries. In: 
Gills, M. (ed.) Tax reform in development countries. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
Bird, R. M. 1992. Tax policy and economic development. Baltimore/London: The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Bratton, M. 2010. Citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 119. Available at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/working-papers/169-wp-119: 
Afrobarometer. 
Braütigam, D. 2008. Introduction: taxation and state-building in developing countries. In: 
Braütigam, D., Fjeldstad, O.-H. & Moore, M. (eds.) Taxation and state-building in 
developing countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
41 
Braütigam, D., O. H. Fjeldstad & M. Moore 2008. Taxation and state-building in developing 
countries: Capacity and consent, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Centre for Development Support 2001. Payment of municipal services project. Research 
Report (April). Bloemfontain: University of the Free State. 
Chand, S. K. & K. O. Moene 1999. Controlling fiscal corruption. World Development, 27, 
1129-1140. 
Chen, D. & R. Reinikka 1999. Business taxation in a low-revenue economy:  A study on 
Uganda in comparison with neighbouring countries. Africa Region Working Paper 
Series No. 3. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Cobham, A. 2005. Tax evasion, tax avoidance and development finance. Queen Elisabeth 
House Working Paper No. 129. Oxford: Oxford University. 
Coolidge, J. & D. Ilic 2009. Tax compliance perceptions and formalization of small 
businesses in south Africa. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 
4992. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Cowell, F. A. 1990. Cheating the government: The economics of evasion, The MIT Press. 
Cowell, F. A. & J. P. F. Gordon 1988. Unwillingness to pay: Tax evasion and public good 
provision. Journal of Public Economics 36, 305-321. 
Cummings, R. G., J. Martinez-Vazquez, M. McKee & B. Torgler 2005. Effects on tax morale 
on compliance: Experimental and survey evidence. CREMA Working Paper no 2005-
29. Basel: Centre for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts. 
Curtis, M., P. Ngowi & A. Arris 2012. The one billion dollar question: How can Tanzania 
stop losing so much tax revenue? Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Episcopal Conference 
(TEC), National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA) and Christian Council of 
Tanzania (CCT). 
D'Arcy, M. 2011. Why do citizens assent to pay tax? Legitimacy, taxation and the African 
state. Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 126. 
Doing Business 2010. Doing Business 2011: Making a difference for entrepreneurs. 
Washington, DC: World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC)  
Doing Business 2011. Doing Business 2012: Doing business in a more transparent world. 
Washington, DC: World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC)  
Doing Business 2012. Doing Business Data. In: Bank, I. F. C. a. W. (ed.). 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data. 
Economic and Social Research Foundation [ESRF] 1996. Budget proposal for 1996/97: A 
synthesis of views from the business community. Report submitted to the Government 
of Tanzaia. Dar es Salam. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
42 
Enterprise Surveys 2012a. Enterprise surveys data 2012. In: World Bank & International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) (eds.). 
Enterprise Surveys. 2012b. Enterprise surveys indicator discriptions, May 2012 [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Mi
sc/Indicator-Descriptions.pdf [Accessed 27.09. 2012]. 
Erard, B. & J. S. Feinstein 1994. Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 25, 1-19. 
Fauvelle-Aymar, C. 1999. The political and tax capacity of government in developing 
countries. Kyklos, 52, 391-413. 
Feld, L. P. & B. S. Frey 2007. Tax compliance as the result of a psychological tax contract: 
The role of incentives and responsive regulation. Law & Policy, 29, 102-120. 
Feld, L. P. & B. S. Frey 2010. Tax evasion and the psychological tax contract. In: Alm, J., 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. & Torgler, B. (eds.) Developing alternative framework for 
explaining tax  compliance. Abingdon/New York: Routledge International Studies in 
Money and Banking. 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. 2004. What's trust got to do with It? Non-payment of service charges in local 
authorities in South Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 42, 539-562. 
Fjeldstad, O. H. 2001. Taxation, coercion and donors. Local government tax enforcement in 
Tanzania. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39, 289-306. 
Fjeldstad, O. H. & K. Heggstad 2012. Local government revenue mobilisation in Anglophone 
Africa. CMI Working Paper, WP 2012:6 Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Fjeldstad, O. H., L. Katera & E. Ngalewa 2009. Maybe we should pay taxes after all? 
Citizens' changing views of taxation in Tanzania. REPOA  Special Paper No. 29. Dar 
es Salaam: Mkuni Na Nyota Publishers. Research on Poverty Allivation. 
Fjeldstad, O. H. & J. Semboja 2001. Why people pay taxes: The case of the development levy 
in Tanzania. World Development, 29, 2059-2074. 
Fuest, C. & N. Riedel 2009. Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditures in developing 
countries: a review of the literature. Report prepared for the UK Department for 
International Development. Oxford: Oxford University Centre for Business and 
Taxation. 
Gauthier, B. & R. Reinikka 2001. Shifting tax burdens through exemptions and evasion: An 
empirical investigation of Uganda. Policy Research Working Paper no 2735. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Gibbons, R. 1992. Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
43 
Graetz, M. J., J. R. Reinganum & L. L. Wilde 1986. The tax compliance game: Toward an 
interactive theory of law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 
1-32. 
Grasmick, H. G. & D. E. Green 1980. Legal punishment, social disapproval and 
internalization as inhibitors of illegal behavior. The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology (1973-), 71, 325-335. 
Grasmick, H. G. & W. J. Scott 1982. Tax evasion and mechanisms of social control: A 
comparison with grand and petty theft. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2, 213-230. 
Hindriks, J., M. Keen & A. Muthoo 1999. Corruption, extortion and evasion. Journal of 
Public Economics, 74, 395-430. 
Hoyland, B., K. O. Moene & F. Willumsen 2008. Be careful when doing busines. Report 
comissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oslo. 
Johnson, R. W. 1999. Not so close to their hearts. An investigation into the non-payment of 
rents, rates and service charges in South Africa's towns and cities. Johannesburg: 
Helen Suzman Foundation (November). 
Kirchler, E., E. Hoelzl & I. Wahl 2008. Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The 
“slippery slope” framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 210-225. 
Krugman, P. R., J. Alm, S. M. Collins & E. M. Remolina 1992. Transforming the Philippine 
economy, Quezon City, APO Production Unit, Inc. 
Levi, M. 1988. Of rule and revenue, Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Levi, M. 1997. Consent, dissent, and patriotism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Levi, M., A. Sacks & T. Tyler 2009. Conceptualizing legitimacy, measuring legitimating 
beliefs. American Behavioral Scientist, 53, 354-375. 
Lieberman, E. S. 2003. Race and regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South 
Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Mahon, J. 2005. Liberal states and fiscal contracts: Aspects of the political economy of public 
finance. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
Mann, A. J. 2004. Are semi-autonomous revenue authorities the right answer to tax 
administration problems in developing countries? A practical guide. Washington, DC: 
USAID. 
McKerchar, M. & C. Evans 2009. Sustaining growth in developing economies through 
improved taxpayer compliance: Challenges for policy makers and revenue authorities. 
eJournal of Tax Research, 7, 171-201. 
Mookherjee, D. & I. P. L. Png 1995. Corruptible supervisors and law enforcers: How should 
they be compensated? Economic Journal, 105, 145-149. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
44 
Moore, M. 1998. Death without taxes: Democracy, state capacity, and aid dependency in the 
fourth world. In: White, G. & Robinson, M. (eds.) Towards a democratic 
developmental state. Oxford: Oxford university press. 
Moore, M. 2004. Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing 
countries. International Political Science Review, 25, 297-319. 
Moore, M. 2008. Between coercion and contract: competing narratives around taxation and 
governance. In: Braütigam, D., Fjeldstad, O.-H. & Moore, M. (eds.) Taxation and 
state-building in developing countries: Capacity and consent. Cambridge: Cambridge 
university press. 
Oberholzer, R. 2007. Perceptions of taxation: a comparative study of different population 
groups in South Africa. Master, University of Pretoria. 
OECD 2001. Compliance measurement. Practice Note. Paris. 
Olson, M. 1965. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, 
Harvard University Press. 
Persson, A. 2008. The institutional sources of statehood - Assimilation, multiculturalism and 
taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa Gothenburg Studies in Politics 111. Gothenburg 
University. 
Picur, R. D. & A. Riahi-Belkaoui 2006. The impact of bureaucracy, corruption and tax 
compliance. Review of Accounting and Finance, 5, 174-180. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011. Paying taxes 2011: The global picture. London/Washington 
DC: PricewaterhouseCoopers, World Bank and International Finance Corporation. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012. Paying taxes 2012: the global picture. London/Washington 
DC: PricewaterhouseCoopers UK LLP, World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation. 
Prichard, R. 2010. Taxation and state-building: towards a governance focused tax reform 
agenda. IDS Working Paper 341. Brighton: Institute of development studies. 
Prichard, R. W. 2009. The politics of taxation and implications for accountability in Ghana 
1981-2008. IDS Working Paper 330. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Richupan, S. 1984. Income tax evasion: a review of the measurement of techniques and some 
estimates for the developing countries. Departmental Memoranddum No. DM/84/46. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department. 
Richupan, S. 1987. Determinants of income tax evasion - Role of tax rates, shape of tax 
schedules and other factors. In: Gandhi, P. (ed.). International Monetary Fund. 
Ritsema, C. M., D. W. Thomas & G. D. Ferrier 2003. Economic and behavioural determinants 
of tax compliance: Evidence from the 1997 Arkansas tax penalty amnesty program. 
Paper presented at the 2003 IRS Research conference. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
45 
Ross, M. L. 2004. Does taxation lead to representation? British Journal of Political Science, 
34, 229-249. 
Rothstein, B. O. & J. A. N. Teorell 2008. What is quality of government? A theory of 
impartial government institutions. Governance, 21, 165-190. 
Sacks, A. 2012. Can donors and non-state actors undermine citizens' legitimating beliefs? 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6158. 
Sah, R. K. 1991. Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 
1272-1295. 
Sandmo, A. 2005. The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view. National Tax Journal, 58, 
643-633. 
Schneider, F. 2005. Shadow economies of 145 countries all over the world: What do we really 
know? . Miemo. University of Linz. 
Schneider, F. 2007. Shadow economies and corruption all over the world: new estimates for 
145 countries. Economics, The Open Access, Open Assesment e-Journal. 
Slemrod, J. 1992. Why people pay taxes: tax compliance and enforcement. In: Slemrod, J. 
(ed.). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Slemrod, J. 2003. Trust in public finance. In: Cnossen, S. & Sinn, H.-W. (eds.) Public finance 
and public policy in the new century. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Smith, K. W. 1992. Why people pay taxes: positive incentives. In: Slemrod, J. (ed.) Why 
people pay taxes: Tax compliance and tax enforcement The University of Michigan 
Press. 
Snavely, K. 1990. Governmental policies to reduce tax evasion: coerced behavior versus 
services and values development. Policy Sciences, 23, 57-72. 
Spicer, M. W. & S. B. Lundstedt 1976. Understanding tax evasion. Public Finance, 31, 295-
305. 
Tanzi, V. 1991. Public finance in developing countries, Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Tanzi, V. 2000a. Corruption, governmental activities and markets. In: Tanzi, V. (ed.) Policies, 
institutions and the dark side of economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Tanzi, V. 2000b. A primer on tax evasion. In: Tanzi, V. (ed.) Policies, institutions and the 
dark side of economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Tayler, T. R. 2006. Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 57, 375-400. 
Tilly, C. 1992. Coercion, capital and European states: AD 990-1992, Malden, Massachusetts, 
Blackwell Publishers Inc. 
CMI WORKING PAPER PEOPLES’ VIEWS OF TAXATION IN AFRICA WP 2012:7 
 
46 
Timmons, J. F. 2005. The fiscal contract: States, taxes and public services. World Politics, 57, 
530-567. 
Torgler, B. & F. Schneider 2007. What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from 
multicultural European countries. Social Science Quarterly, 88, 443-470. 
Yankelovich, Skelly & White 1984. Taxpayer attitudes study: Final report. Public opinion 
survey prepared for the Internal Revenue Services. Washington, DC: Internal Revenue 
Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
 
 
CMI WORKING PAPERS
This series can be ordered from:
CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute)
Phone: +47 47 93 80 00 
Fax: +47 47 93 80 01
E-mail: cmi@cmi.no
P.O.Box 6033 Bedriftssenteret,
N-5892 Bergen, Norway
Visiting address: 
Jekteviksbakken 31, Bergen
Web: www.cmi.no 
Price: NOK 50
Printed version: ISSN 0804-3639
Electronic version: ISSN 1890-5048
Printed version: ISBN 978-82-8062-444-4
Electronic version: ISBN 978-82-8062-445-1
This paper is also available at:
www.cmi.no/publications
INDEXING TERMS
Taxation   Tax behaviour
Compliance  Evasion
Fiscal exchange  Surveys
Africa
What are the key determinants of taxpayer compliance? And which features 
of citizen-state relations govern attitudes and behaviour regarding 
taxation? This paper examines the analytical foundation, methodological 
approaches and key findings of available empirical literature on taxpayer 
behaviour in Africa. Understanding how citizens perceive and experience 
taxation may provide an essential diagnostic of the political realities for 
tax reform. Attempts to broaden the tax base require insights into how 
citizens experience and perceive the tax system, whether people perceive 
they are paying taxes or not, what they eventually pay, their views on tax 
administration and enforcement, and whether and how their tax behaviour is 
correlated with how they perceive the state. Attitude and perception surveys 
of current and potential taxpayers may also help to identify perceived 
weaknesses of the tax system, and enable tax authorities to focus attention 
efficiently on high-risk categories of taxpayers.
ICTD
